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Abstract
A wealth of literature suggests individuals use feelings in addition to facts as sources of information for
judgment. This paper focuses on a manipulation in which participants list either a few or many examples of a
given type, and then make a judgment. Instead of using the number of arguments or evidence strength,
participants are hypothesized to use the subjective ease of generating examples as the primary input to
judgment. This result is commonly called the ease-of-retrieval effect, and the feeling of ease is typically assumed
to mediate the effect. We use meta-analytic methods across 142 papers, 263 studies, and 582 effect sizes to
assess the robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect, and whether or not the effect is mediated by subjective
ease. On average, the standard few/many manipulation exhibits a medium-sized effect. In experimental
conditions designed to replicate the standard effect, about one third to one half of the total effect is mediated
by subjective ease. This supports the standard explanation, but suggests that other mediators are present.
Further, we find evidence of publication bias that reduces the standard effect by up to one-third. We also find
that (1) moderator manipulations that differ from the standard manipulation lead to smaller, often reversed
effects that are not as strongly mediated as ease, (2) several manipulations of theory-based moderators (e.g.,
polarized attitudes, misattribution) yield strong theory-consistent effects, (2) method-based moderators have
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Abstract 
 
A wealth of literature suggests individuals use feelings in addition to facts as sources of 
information for judgment. This paper focuses on a manipulation in which participants list either a 
few or many examples of a given type, and then make a judgment. Instead of using the number 
of arguments or evidence strength, participants are hypothesized to use the subjective ease of 
generating examples as the primary input to judgment. This result is commonly called the ease-
of-retrieval effect, and the feeling of ease is typically assumed to mediate the effect. We use 
meta-analytic methods across 142 papers, 263 studies, and 582 effect sizes to assess the 
robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect, and whether or not the effect is mediated by subjective 
ease. On average, the standard few/many manipulation exhibits a medium-sized effect. In 
experimental conditions designed to replicate the standard effect, about one third to one half of 
the total effect is mediated by subjective ease. This supports the standard explanation, but 
suggests that other mediators are present. Further, we find evidence of publication bias that 
reduces the standard effect by up to one-third. We also find that (1) moderator manipulations that 
differ from the standard manipulation lead to smaller, often reversed effects that are not as 
strongly mediated by ease, (2) several manipulations of theory-based moderators (e.g., polarized 
attitudes, misattribution) yield strong theory-consistent effects, (3) method-based moderators 
have little or no effects on the results, and (4) the mediation results are robust with respect to 
assumptions about error structure.   
 
Public Significance Statement: This quantitative review suggests a medium-sized impact of 
feelings of ease of recall on judgment, but it argues feelings of ease alone may not fully explain 
classical inductions of feeling-based effects. This review also reports several moderators of when 
individuals use their feelings in judgment.  
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Does Ease Mediate the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect? A Meta-Analysis 
 
 A man’s wife asks him, "Do remember the day we first met?" He immediately answers, 
"Of course.”  She then asks, "What was I wearing?” He replies, "Tight fitting jeans, a black 
sweater, black Nike running shoes, and a weirdly huge leather jacket." She smiles. He smiles.  
 It is not surprising that the wife believes that her husband's excellent memory is evidence 
of his love. What is surprising is the conjecture that his quick, easy memory strengthens the 
husband's own belief about the depth of his love for his wife. That is, in addition to the facts that 
are recalled, the conjecture claims that the experience of remembering, the feeling of ease, is 
itself treated as information that can influence our judgments. This conjecture is called the ease-
of-retrieval effect, and there is a large literature devoted to it. This paper is a meta-analysis of 
that large literature and aims to answer the question, "Does ease mediate the ease-of-retrieval 
effect?" 
Introduction 
 Decades of research in psychology and economics have challenged “rational” theories of 
human decision-making (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1978). Critically, individuals do not always base their decisions on the 
weight of evidence pro and con, but often use other cues and heuristics that are not relevant from 
a normative perspective (Albarracin, Johnson, & Zanna, 2005; Bettman et al., 1998; Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). One famous example is the availability heuristic. According to the availability 
heuristic, individuals make judgments based on how easy it feels to bring examples to mind 
rather than based on the strength of those examples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
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One very general perspective accounts for many of the non-normative findings by 
hypothesizing that feelings are often mixed in with facts as decision inputs (Greifeneder, Bless, 
& Pham, 2011; Pham, 1998; Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007). These 
feelings include both affective feelings (i.e., experiences of moods or emotions, such as 
happiness; Pham, 2004) and cognitive feelings (i.e., experiences of mental activities, 
metacognition, such as feelings of ease; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz, 2010; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007). For example, the availability heuristic is hypothesized to result from 
the use of feelings of ease as an input to judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007).    
Cognitive feelings are typically divided into two major forms: processing fluency and 
accessibility experiences (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Processing fluency is the subjective ease 
with which information is encoded, and accessibility experiences are the feelings of the ease with 
which information is retrieved from memory (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007). This paper focuses on the specific hypothesis that accessibility experiences are part of a 
meta-cognitive process that affects judgment (Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). This 
meta-cognitive role is very similar to the role of feelings of familiarity in the recognition 
memory literature (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Johnston, Dark, & 
Jacoby, 1985).  
 One seminal demonstration of the effects of accessibility experiences is Schwarz et al. 
(1991), in which individuals first generated examples of being assertive and then rated their 
assertiveness on a multi-item scale. The critical manipulation was whether the experimenters 
requested participants to write few (6) or many (12) examples (i.e., a few-versus-many 
manipulation). The critical result was that self-rated assertiveness was lower in the "many" 
condition than in the “few” condition. Schwarz et al. contended that, although those in the 
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“many” condition had more evidence to support high assertiveness than those in the “few” 
condition, they rated themselves lower because they inferred low assertiveness from the 
difficulty they experienced in the example-generation task. This type of metacognitive inference 
has become the standard explanation of the effects of the few-versus-many manipulation and, 
therefore, such effects are commonly called ease-of-retrieval effects. Importantly, the ease-of-
retrieval effect is the opposite of what is predicted by content numerosity (i.e., people using 
number of examples, which they have more of in the “many” condition; Pelham, Smurata, & 
Myaskovsky, 1994) and polarization (i.e., attitudes becoming more extreme with more 
information; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979).  
 Metacognitive inferences based on subjective ease have also been proposed as 
explanations for the effects of the few-versus-many manipulation on judgments about traits, 
attitudes, likelihoods, and preferences. For example, this manipulation has been used in studies 
of health (by influencing perceived vulnerability; Raghubir & Menon, 1998), consumer 
preference (by tilting preference for compromise options; Novemsky et al., 2007), and policy and 
political figure attitudes (by affecting support for them; Haddock, 2002; Wänke, Bless, & Biller, 
1996). Moreover, this manipulation has been used in experiments examining a wide variety of 
tasks, such as product choice (Zhao et al., 2012), cooperation (Müller et al., 2010), and 
prediction (Pham, Lee, & Stephen, 2012). One indicator of the influence of both the 
manipulation and the ease-of-retrieval explanation is that the original Schwarz et al. (1991) paper 
has 577 citations on Web of Science and 1224 on Google Scholar as of July 2017. 
 Although subjective ease is the dominant explanation, other accounts of the ease-of-
retrieval effect have been proposed. First, individuals in the “many” condition might 
spontaneously think of more conflicting examples than individuals in the "few" condition, which 
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would yield directionally-similar effects as ease (Tormala et al., 2007; but see Wänke et al., 
1996; Wänke, 2013). Second, Kühnen (2010) proposed that placing the ease question before the 
dependent measure in studies creates a demand effects that explains the results. Finally, ease 
might increase confidence in what is generated. Subsequently, confidence may then influence 
judgments and attitudes (Wänke & Bless, 2000; Tormala et al., 2002). According to these 
accounts, subjective ease is not the only or the most immediate mediator of the observed effects. 
  The existence of these alternative explanations and causal paths increases the desirability 
of determining the extent to which subjective ease, by itself, mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect. 
If ease does not fully explain the effect (i.e., a mediation analysis reveals a residual direct effect 
that is comparable in size to the indirect effect based on subjective ease), then the alternative 
explanations are potentially necessary for a full account of the phenomenon. 
This paper reports a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect and is designed (a) to 
test the robustness of the effect, (b) to examine the extent to which subjective ease of retrieval 
mediates the effect, (c) to find evidence for or against several theoretical accounts of the effect, 
and (d) to determine if methodological factors might account for variation in effect sizes. Our 
analyses provide five main results. First, we find a medium effect size estimate for experimental 
conditions that were designed to conceptually replicate the original ease-of-retrieval effect, 
which we call the standard paradigm. Second, we find that accounting for publication bias could 
potentially reduce the standard paradigm’s effect size by approximately a third. Third, we find 
support for several theory-based moderators of the effect. Fourth, we find little support for 
several potential artifacts that have been proposed in the literature or for methodological 
moderators other than publication status. Fifth, we find that subjective ease is a robust partial 
mediator for proximal dependent measures in the standard paradigm, but that the direct effect is 
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equally robust, suggesting that other mediators are present, even under "ideal" conditions. Also, 
reasonable assumptions about heterogeneity, measurement error, and correlated error lead to 
smaller estimates of the indirect effect and larger estimates of the direct effect, again suggesting 
that other mediators are present.  
Theory-Based and Methodological Moderators of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect 
One important goal of this meta-analysis is to examine a wide range of theory-based 
moderators that have been proposed in the feelings-as-information literature. These moderators 
provide potential explanations of heterogeneity in effect sizes. We divide these moderators into 
those that potentially inform theories of judgment (e.g., misattribution and involvement) and 
those that are mainly exploratory or methodological (e.g., the country in which data were 
collected).  
It is useful to subdivide theory-based moderators according to how they influence the use 
of subjective ease. First, there are moderators that affect the experience of ease or its 
accessibility. We call these moderators salience-based. Second, there are moderators that 
influence the relationship between the manipulation and the dependent measure by changing 
either the weighting of ease as an informational input or the weighting of other non-feeling 
inputs in the judgment process. We call these moderators inference-based. The impact of these 
two classes of moderators can be seen in Figure 1. By making subjective ease more salient, 
salience moderators might change the effect of the manipulation (S1 in Figure 1), or they might 
change the effect of subjective ease on the dependent measure by changing the accessibility of 
this input (S2). Inference-based moderators might also change the effect of ease on the dependent 
measure (I2), not by changing the accessibility of ease, but by changing the implications people 
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draw from this cognitive feeling. Additionally, inference-based moderators might trigger some 
other non-ease mechanism (I1). 
We drew upon a series of reviews within the ease-of-retrieval and feelings-as-information 
literatures to identify a set of salience and inference moderators. These reviews included 
Greifeneder, Bless, and Pham (2011), Petty et al. (2007), Schwarz (1998, 2004), Schwarz and 
Clore (1988, 2007), and Wänke (2013). Our meta-analysis builds on these reviews by 
systematically coding the ease-of-retrieval studies in our database in terms of these moderators 
and then quantitatively testing the extent to which those moderators are associated with 
differences in effect size. 
While some moderators apply to the whole study (e.g., type of dependent measure, 
publication status), other moderators exist only for some conditions within a study (e.g., 
misattribution used or not; polarized attitude or not). Therefore, for each paper, we split up the 
experiment by moderator level into a few-versus-many effect size for each level of the 
moderator.  
Salience Moderators 
 Salience moderators are those that affect the retrievability of content or the experience of 
ease. These salience moderators should therefore exert an influence through an impact of the 
manipulation on experienced ease (S1) or the impact of ease on the dependent measure (S2).  
 Range. Feelings of subjective ease are likely to become more salient when the retrieval 
task is either much easier or much more difficult than usual. As the difference increases between 
the number of items required for the “few” and “many” conditions, it is more likely that one or 
both will be far from the usual level of retrieval ease. We operationalize this moderator as range 
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(i.e., "many" target number - "few" target number). This metric should be positively related to 
the size of the effect, as it should affect ease and the downstream impact of the manipulation. 
 Attention. The salience of cognitive feelings should be enhanced when attention is 
explicitly directed toward those feelings. Many ease-of-retrieval experiments include an explicit 
measure of feelings of ease. When the feelings of ease are explicitly measured before (rather than 
after) the target judgment, attention is drawn to cognitive feelings, which makes them more 
salient during the target judgment (Danziger et al., 2005; Kühnen, 2010). This should lead to 
larger effect sizes.  
 Polarized attitude. Individuals with either polarized or crystallized attitudes are less 
likely to experience difficulty in generating examples (S1), which should decrease the impact of 
the few-versus-many manipulation and thereby decrease effect sizes (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 
1999; Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999). However, it is also possible that those with 
polarized attitudes make fewer meta-cognitive inference based on ease (I2) or rely on other 
information or inferences (I1). 
Inference Moderators 
 These moderators include those manipulations within experiments or differences across 
experiments that affect the perceived meaning of feelings of ease (I2) or introduce considerations 
of other possible cues to judgment that run contrary to the predictions of ease as an input or 
increase the direct effect of the few-versus-many manipulation (I1). 
Processing motivation (depth). The first set of moderators concerns processing 
motivation, meaning the extent to which an individual is willing to deeply consider the scenario 
or judgment in question (Chaiken et al., 1989; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Petty et al., 
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2007; Schwarz, 2004).  We distinguish two types of processing motivation: depth and 
involvement. 
Depth of processing factors found in the ease-of-retrieval literature include accuracy 
motivation (i.e., no ease effect for high accuracy motivation; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), 
availability of cognitive processing resources (i.e., ease effects stronger for those under cognitive 
constraint; Greifeneder & Bless, 2007), and whether people are in positive or negative moods 
(Ruder & Bless, 2003), the latter of which should lead to greater systematic processing (lower 
effect sizes; also see Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Consistent with this logic, Ruder and Bless (2003) 
find a reversed ease-of-retrieval effect for participants induced to feel sad.  
Processing motivation (involvement). The most prominent type of motivation factor in 
the ease-of-retrieval literature is whether people engage in low involvement or heuristic (i.e., 
individuals process few pieces of information with less effort) versus high involvement 
systematic (i.e., individuals analytically evaluate much more information carefully; Chaiken et 
al., 1989) processing. The ease-of-retrieval effect was originally specified in terms of the 
heuristic-systematic model and hypothesized to reflect a heuristic (low elaboration) strategy for 
individuals for whom the target judgment has low personal relevance (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1984). Two initial articles found that individuals with higher personal relevance 
(which presumably increased systematic processing) in a topic reversed the predictions of ease-
of-retrieval, while individuals with lower personal relevance (which presumably increased 
heuristic processing) produced results consistent with ease-of-retrieval (Grayson & Schwarz, 
1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). However, Tormala et al. (2002) provides another account of 
how involvement should affect the use of feelings of ease. In this view, individuals who 
elaborate more should pay attention to their higher-order thoughts and thus incorporate ease into 
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their judgments (Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004; Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009; Petty et al., 2007; 
Tormala et al., 2002). Thus, these authors hypothesize that their manipulation of processing 
motivation should have effects opposite to those of the previously mentioned authors (i.e., the 
ease-of-retrieval effect should be enhanced).  Although the manipulations of involvement are not 
identical across studies, they are conceptually focused on personal relevance and the difference 
in predictions arises from assumptions about how personal relevance affects the likelihood of 
systematic processing. Thus, the meta-analytic results for this moderator are potentially 
informative about the relationship between cognitive feelings and systematic processing. 
 Representativeness (retrieval target). Individuals should be more likely to apply 
feelings to target judgments when their feelings are believed to be more representative of the 
target of the retrieval task (e.g., your own assertiveness; Schwarz et al., 1991; Greifeneder et al., 
2011). For example, individuals are more likely to display an ease-of-retrieval effect when 
making judgments about themselves as opposed to others (e.g., Caruso, 2008) because their 
feelings are more representative of themselves than of others. Similarly, the applicability of ease 
differs depending on whether individuals judge in-group as compared to out-group members 
because their feelings are more representative of the in-group than the out-group (Rothman & 
Hardin, 1997; Woltin et al., 2014).  
Representativeness (misattribution). Feelings should be less likely to be used as an 
input to judgment when the informational value of the feelings has been obviated by other 
information (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Several studies employ misattribution paradigms in 
which participants are given another cause to which subjective ease can be attributed (e.g., 
difficulty due to simultaneous music; e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991). These elements are 
hypothesized to render subjective ease non-diagnostic for the judgment (reduce effect sizes) 
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because some other source was the reason for ease, so the metacognitive inference about the 
meaning of personal ease is discounted (Schwarz et al., 1991; Unkelbach, 2006). In Schwarz et 
al. (1991), this source was music; in Ruder and Bless (2003), this source was an oddly-shaped 
writing space. Neither of these sources had meaning for the target judgment. 
 Relevance of feelings (judgment task). Multiple articles within the feelings-as-
information stream of research suggest that people are more likely to use feelings as inputs when 
those feelings are perceived to be relevant to the target judgment task (Greifeneder, Bless, & 
Pham, 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). This is exemplified by Schwarz and Clore’s 
(2007) perceived relevance of feelings of ease for a judgment. This concept is different from 
perceived informational value because, unlike that construct, relevance focuses on the bearing 
feelings have on the judgment task rather than the target of retrieval. 
 Relevance of feelings (disposition). Relevance may be influenced by such factors as 
individual differences (disposition) such as reliance on feelings or expertise (Schwarz & Clore, 
2007). Multiple papers within the ease-of-retrieval paradigm suggest experts are less likely to 
employ feelings (Ofir, 2000), and those who are more likely to trust their feelings (e.g., higher or 
lower experiential style; higher faith in intuition; e.g., Danziger et al., 2005; Keller & Bless, 
2009) are more likely to show the ease-of-retrieval effect (i.e., stronger effect sizes). 
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
 We additionally investigate potential moderators of the ease-of-retrieval effect that are 
mainly methodological and have few, if any theoretical implications. Thus, these moderators are 
more exploratory in nature. 
 Year. The ease-of-retrieval effect studies in question range from 1991 to present-day. We 
examine whether there is variation in effect sizes depending on publication year, which may be 
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concurrent with changes in the methodology and the hunt for more moderators (Mooneyham, 
Franklin, Mrazek, & Schooler, 2012; Schooler, 2011).  
 Country. The ease-of-retrieval effect has been studied across continents in America (e.g., 
Tormala et al., 2002), Australia (e.g., Laham, 2013), Germany (Schwarz et al., 1991), and other 
countries.  
 Publication Status. As in many other meta-analyses, the publication status of studies 
may be related to their effect size. Studies with nonsignificant p-values or small effect sizes may 
have been rejected by journal editors and relegated to the "filedrawer" or could be hidden within 
parts of unpublished dissertations (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).  
Number of dependent measures. The number of measures used to measure subjective 
ease and the dependent variable of interest also varies widely from study to study. Some studies 
include only one measure of ease (e.g., Bartels & Urminsky, 2011), while others include two 
(e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2008) or three (e.g., Avnet, 2005). These measures are typically 
averaged to form a single ease-of-retrieval index. Similarly, studies measuring trait ratings or 
attitudes have substantial variation in their number of measures used to form a composite 
dependent variable. We incorporate this variability into our analyses as a measure of precision 
and potential measurement error for the hypothesized mediator (i.e., subjective ease) and the 
dependent measure of interest. When effect sizes were composed of an average of two dependent 
measures with differing number of items (e.g., a one-item scale and a six-item scale), we 
averaged the number of items for this variable (yielding 3.5 for the previous example). 
Attitude versus non-attitudes. We classify the different dependent measures in this 
literature into two broad categories: attitude-based measures and non-attitude measures. These 
broad categories are meant to capture potential differences in dependent measure types (such as 
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reliability, response bias, or response scale familiarity). Attitude-based measures cover multiple 
different types of responses (e.g., self-rated traits, policy evaluations; Ruder & Bless, 2003; 
Schwarz et al., 1991), whereas non-attitude include such measures as subjective likelihood and 
frequency (e.g., Sanna et al., 2002) or observable behaviors (e.g., Stephen & Pham, 2008).   
A Taxonomy of Ease-of-Retrieval Effects: 
Standard and Moderated Paradigms, Proximal and Distal Mediation 
To determine the extent to which ease mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect, it is necessary 
to identify the experimental conditions meant by the authors to conceptually replicate the 
original Schwarz et al. (1991) ease-of-retrieval effect. We refer to these conditions as using the 
standard paradigm. The remaining experimental conditions, in which authors hypothesize that 
the ease-of-retrieval effect will be attenuated or reversed, are said to use a moderated paradigm. 
Based on this taxonomy, we construct three datasets: standard, moderated, and combined 
(i.e., both paradigms). The combined dataset provides the greatest variation in moderators 
because many moderators are held constant in each paradigm (e.g., moderator present or 
moderator absent). Therefore, the combined dataset is most useful for assessing the overall 
effectiveness of the moderators proposed in the literature to alter the size (and direction) of the 
ease-of-retrieval effect. That is, it provides the highest-powered tests of moderation. Also, a 
subset of our data includes additional effect sizes that mediation analyses, and the combined 
dataset is most useful in identifying the sources of moderation. That is, if a specific moderator 
influences the total effect size, we can check whether it has a similar impact on the indirect effect 
that is mediated by ease (a x b; see Figure 2) or it exerts influence by increasing the size of the 
direct effect (c’), suggesting the presence of other causal factors. The standard paradigm data 
provides (1) the best estimate of the size of ease-of-retrieval effect and (2) the best test of 
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subjective ease as the best explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect as originally conceived. 
Analyses of the total effect from the moderated dataset are included for completeness. 
One second, important division in the data pertains to the relationship between the recall 
task and the dependent measure of interest. In some studies, subjects are asked to recall examples 
of assertiveness and then provide ratings of their assertiveness (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), or 
recall reasons in favor or against public transportation before evaluating public transportation 
(Wänke et al., 1996). In these cases, the generated examples are directly relevant for the task 
used for the dependent measure (often an attitude or likelihood judgment) and, therefore, 
constitute clear examples of the feelings-as-information hypothesis that is the focus of this meta-
analysis. We refer to the effect sizes from studies of this type as proximal because the impact of 
subjective ease on the dependent measure is direct and does not require further assumptions 
about how ease should affect the dependent measure of interest.  
However, there are also cases in which the few-versus-many manipulation pertains to one 
subject matter (e.g., reasons New York is positive or negative; Alter & Balcetis, 2011), while the 
dependent measure concerns something not recalled (e.g., how far away New York feels). In 
these cases, beyond what is recalled in the few-versus-many manipulation, there must be an 
intermediary mechanism that explains the causal relationship between ease and the dependent 
measure (e.g., a connection between attitudes towards New York and how far away it feels). We 
call these distal effect sizes because there is an additional mediator between ease and the 
dependent measure that requires assumptions, theories, or models outside of feelings-as-
information theory. One implication of these intermediary mechanisms is that a null effect may 
not be inconsistent with feelings-as-information; the intervening mechanism may be wrong (i.e., 
the non-ease mechanism thought to affect the dependent measure, contrary to predictions, does 
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not). Because of this difference in explanations, we further divide the combined, standard, and 
moderated datasets into two subsets that are analyzed separately: proximal and distal. Examples 
of proximal and distal effect sizes can be found in Table 1. We perform all analyses on both 
datasets; however, the proximal effect sizes are of greater interest because they are more direct 
tests of the focal hypothesis that cognitive feelings of ease are being used as information in the 
judgment process.  
Methodology 
Literature Search 
The widespread use of the "few-versus-many" manipulation in disparate experimental 
literatures made keyword search ineffective because no simple set of keywords could capture the 
entire literature efficiently. Sets of keywords such as “ease-of-retrieval” and “retrieval fluency” 
did not capture all papers that forward searches of the major articles in the literature did, whereas 
the latter yielded all papers found by the former. Therefore, we examined forward citations of the 
original empirical paper that reported the ease-of-retrieval effect, Schwarz et al. (1991), and two 
major reviews, Schwarz (1998) and Schwarz (2004), using the ISI Web of Knowledge. We also 
looked at forward citations of published articles citing Schwarz et al. (1991) that employed the 
few-versus-many manipulation within the following ten-year period (1992-2001)1. Additionally, 
we searched Proquest Dissertations and Theses database for papers that had the names of the 
Schwarz et al. (1991; “Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability 
Heuristic”), Schwarz (1998; (“Accessible content and accessibility experiences: The interplay of 
                                                
1 These articles included Aarts & Dijksterhuis (1999); Belli, Winkielman, Read, Schwarz, & Lynn (1998); Broemer 
(2001); Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock (1999); Grayson & Schwarz (1999); Haddock, Rothman, & Schwarz 
(1996); Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz (1999); Merckelbach, Wiers, Horselenberg, & Wessel (2001); Ofir 
(2000); Raghubir & Menon (1998); Rothman & Hardin (1997); Rothman & Schwarz (1998); Vaughn (1999); 
Wänke, Bless, & Biller (1996); Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch (1997); Winkielman & Schwarz (2001); and 
Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli (1998). 
 17 
declarative and experiential information in judgment”), and Schwarz (2004; “Metacognitive 
Experiences in Consumer Judgment and Decision Making”) in their text as citations. Finally, we 
cross-referenced PsychFileDrawer.org and the Reproducibility Project Open Science Framework 
for any replications of papers in our search. We completed this search by April 2014. 
 We then contacted authors2 who had available contact information to inquire about 
unpublished studies, effect sizes not reported in their paper, and to ask them to verify our 
classification of their experimental conditions into standard and moderated paradigms. As part of 
this process we sent spreadsheets to individual authors that contained the effect sizes we had 
obtained from their publications. The spreadsheet also indicated which measures were missing 
and how we had interpreted their studies in terms of the standard and moderated paradigms. An 
example of one of these sheets for Pablo Briñol is provided in Appendix Figure A1. Example e-
mail text is provided in Appendix A.  
Further, to solicit researchers for other possible file-drawer studies, we sent messages 
requesting unpublished data through the following listservs: ACR-L, SCP, SJDM, and SPSP.  
Inclusion Criteria 
 We included articles using the following two criteria: 
1) Presence of few-versus-many manipulation: Studies had to include a between-subjects 
manipulation that required writing or imagining a smaller number of examples versus a larger 
number of examples. We only used between-subjects manipulations given the overwhelming 
majority of studies were between-subjects, and because it is unclear how to interpret the within-
subject version of this task since that effect may not be entirely due to ease. We excluded 
conditions in which readers reviewed what other writers had produced (e.g., Wänke et al., 1996; 
                                                
2 We contacted first authors except when an author with multiple publications was also on the publication and was 
contacted, or when the first author’s contact information could not be found.	
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Weick & Guinote, 2008) because these conditions do not require the task of interest (i.e., 
example generation). 
When multiple numbers of arguments were present (e.g., four, eight, and 12 arguments; 
e.g., Belli et al., 1998; e.g., one, three, and seven arguments; e.g., Sinha & Naykankuppam, 2013, 
Study 1), we only used the minimum and maximum number of arguments conditions that were 
of the same topic for computing effect sizes. Only three papers in our final database ultimately 
used more than two levels for number of arguments.3  
2) Statistics: Studies needed to have enough information from which to calculate a 
contrast between the “few” condition and corresponding “many” condition. When information to 
compute effect sizes was unavailable, we contacted authors as mentioned earlier. 
Meta-Analytic Methodology 
 We used means and standard deviations, F ratios, t-tests, d values, r values, and log-odds 
ratios to compute effect sizes based on standard formulae (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Rosenthal & 
Rosnow, 2008). 
Most experiments manipulated some other factor in addition to few-versus-many. 
Sometimes all levels were the same paradigm type (e.g., a standard paradigm might manipulate 
whether assertiveness or unassertiveness was the dependent measure with the expectation that 
these were conceptual replications). Sometimes the manipulation changed the paradigm type 
(e.g., control versus alternative attribution for subjective ease). In all cases, each level of the 
factor was used to obtain effect sizes. Three effect sizes were sought: (1) the effect of few-
versus-many (X) on the dependent variable of interest (Y), (2) the effect of X on subjective ease 
                                                
3	Excluding the studies that tried multiple levels of few and many conditions does not have an enormous impact on 
our effect size results (Standard: r = .253; Moderated: r = -.178; Overall: r = .121). 
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(M), and (3) the effect of subjective ease (M) on the dependent variable of interest (Y).  We refer 
to these effect sizes as mediation triplets. 
We calculated effect sizes in terms of Pearson’s r because of its ease of interpretation 
across different measures (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). We conducted analyses of the simple 
correlations using Fisher’s z for distributional reasons, but we report all results in in terms of r 
for interpretability (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). We weight the 
effect sizes by their inverse variance (i.e., n-3 for Fisher’s z) using random effects formulae4 
from the meta-analysis literature (Borenstein et al., 2009; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001).  
We averaged the rXY values across effect sizes for all dependent measures with sufficient 
statistical information. We used all measures to prevent biases based on trying to pick only one 
dependent measure for each study. Effect sizes of this type were relatively rare, 21% of proximal 
effect sizes and 13% of distal effect sizes. For the mediation triplets, we used only one dependent 
measure based on which measure had sufficient statistical information available for rMY. When 
multiple measures had information for rMY, we used the median value (or minimum of two values 
when an even number of values were present); additional analyses with non-included values 
yielded similar results. Taking the average of the rMY values for the averaged rXY values could 
potentially violate assumptions of mediation analysis (e.g., the indirect effect is the product of 
two effect sizes, a and b, and the product of averages is not the same as the average of products), 
so this approach was not used.  
                                                
4	We also note the weighted fixed-effects aggregate effect sizes are different (Standard: r = .144; Moderated: r = -.173; Overall: r 
= .083) from our main random-effects results. However, this deviation is primarily due to unpublished effect sizes from the 
standard paradigm for studies that are much larger than all other studies (Yeager & Krosnick, 2014). Removing these points 
reveals a weighted fixed-effects aggregate effect size that’s not drastically different from the random effects results (Standard: r = 
.241; Moderated: r = -.173; Overall: r = .118), and does not affect the conclusions from the moderator results on the total effect.  
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Publication Bias 
 We assessed publication bias by examining the simple ease-of-retrieval effect, rXY, in two 
ways: trim-and-fill analysis of funnel plots (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a, 2000b; Light & Pillemar, 
1984) and PET-PEESE (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014).  
First, the funnel plot is a graphical display of precision (here standard error) by effect size 
(Light & Pillemar, 1984). In a standard funnel plot, effect sizes should converge towards a 
tighter estimate of an overall effect size as the studies become more precise, producing a funnel 
shape (Sutton, 2009). However, if there is publication bias, there will be an asymmetry in the 
funnel for smaller, less precise studies with near-zero effect sizes that may not have had 
significant findings to publish (Egger et al., 1997). The trim-and-fill algorithm (Viechtbauer, 
2010) "corrects" this asymmetry by first trimming the asymmetric portion of the funnel plot, then 
re-estimating the mean effect size and its confidence interval for the remaining studies. Finally, 
the trim-and-fill algorithm re-fills in the funnel with both the trimmed studies (that created the 
funnel asymmetry) and their corresponding "missing" observations reflected across the mean of 
the funnel (Duval & Tweedie, 2000).  
Second, PET-PEESE is a method by which an effect size is extracted from the intercept 
of an Egger regression that is intended to represent the publication-bias adjusted effect size from 
a study with zero standard error (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). 
PET (Precision Effect Test) employs standard error as the predictor in this regression, and errs on 
the side of underestimating the true effect size. PEESE (Precision Effect Estimate with Standard 
Error) uses variance instead. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2014) advise that when PET yields an 
intercept significantly different from zero, individuals should rely on the intercept from PEESE 
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as the underlying effect size. Otherwise, PET’s estimate of the effect size is more accurate (but, 
also see Gervais, 2015).  
Moderator Coding 
Salience moderators. We coded the three salience moderators discussed earlier as 
follows. First, we coded the difference between the number of arguments in the “many” and 
“few” conditions as range.  Second, we coded whether the measure of subjective ease on 
subjective ease occurred before or after the dependent measure of interest (1 = before, -1 = after) 
as attention. Finally, we coded polarized attitude as present (+1; -1 otherwise), if such attitudes 
were explicitly noted in the paper (e.g., high interest in politics; crystallized attitude; e.g., 
Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999) or if participants were described as having expertise 
(which was assuming to imply a polarized attitude).  
Inference moderators. We code the six inference moderators discussed earlier as 
follows.  First, we code processing motivation (depth) based on whether processing depth or 
motivation was influenced by a non-involvement manipulation (+1 = increased, -1 = decreased, 0 
= no manipulation). Examples of manipulations that would increase processing motivation or 
capacity would be inducing sadness (e.g., Ruder & Bless, 2003), boosting accuracy motivation 
(e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), or increasing uncertainty (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 2011a). 
Examples of manipulations that decrease processing motivation or capacity would be those that 
eat up cognitive resources (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2007) or decrease uncertainty (e.g., 
Greifeneder et al., 2011a). These manipulations should decrease effect sizes if depth is boosted. 
Second, we code processing motivation (involvement) based on whether involvement is stated to 
be manipulated as more (+1; e.g., higher need for cognition individuals; e.g., Tormala et al., 
2002) or less (-1) personally involving than when involvement is not explicitly manipulated (0).  
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Third, we code representativeness (retrieval target) based on whether the target of recall is the 
self (+1) or not (-1).5 Fourth, we code representativeness (misattribution) paradigms based on 
whether an attribution to another source (e.g., music, an unusual writing space; e.g., Ruder & 
Bless, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991) was present (+1) or not (-1).  Fifth, we code relevance of 
feelings (judgment task) based on whether individuals are making judgments about themselves 
(+1) or not (-1).6  Sixth, we code relevance of feelings (disposition) based on whether individuals 
are personally more likely to see their feelings as relevant to judgment (+1; e.g., experiential 
processors, high-powered individuals; e.g., Danziger et al., 2005; Weick & Guinote, 2008) or 
less likely (-1; e.g., individuals with less faith in intuition; e.g., Keller & Bless, 2009; 0 for no 
manipulation).  
Exploratory methodological moderators. We coded the following study characteristics 
as moderators as part of our exploratory analyses: (a) the year, (b) the country in which the study 
was published (in the US = +1, non-US = -1), (c) whether the study was published or 
unpublished (+1 = unpublished, -1 = published); (d) the number of items in the subjective ease 
measure; (e) the number of items in the dependent variable of interest;7 and (f) attitude 
dependent measure (e.g., +1 = attitude measure, -1 = all other measures).8  
Taxonomy. Based on a careful reading of the authors' hypotheses, experimental 
conditions were classified as either a standard or a moderated paradigm. As part of our outreach 
                                                
5	We alternatively also coded a variable about whether the recall was episodic or semantic. The same results held for 
this coding scheme, which was highly correlated with self/not-self.	
6	We recognize this has some conceptual overlap with representativeness and may be better categorized as such; the 
results for both this moderator and retrieval target are consistent, and we return to these in the general discussion.	
7	We cap the maximum number of measures at 9 given 91% of proximal’s distribution and 84% of distal’s 
distribution fall between 1-8 measures, and all other measures use far lengthier scales that skew the distribution.	
8	One question may revolve around whether attitude certainty measures are coded separately from attitude measures. 
These measures comprise a small portion (<5%) of the database and do not significantly differ from any other 
category of dependent measure (attitude or non-attitude). 
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to authors, we requested authors review our categorization of standard and moderated paradigm 
assignments for their experiments.  We provided authors with the following definition of 
standard and moderated paradigms: "Importantly, we are separating reported results into 
experimental conditions that the authors present as conceptual replications of the original effect 
reported by Schwarz et al. (1991) -- the standard paradigm -- and conditions in which the authors 
change the standard paradigm in ways that they expect will moderate the effect, causing 
attenuation or reversal." 
We also separated effect sizes based on whether they were proximal or distal effect sizes 
(see earlier discussion and Table 1). In some cases, a paper could contribute both proximal and 
distal effect sizes because multiple dependent measures were used (e.g., Alter & Balcetis, 2011; 
Bartels & Urminsky, 2011).  
Coding reliability.  All moderators were originally coded by the first author, and then 
coded a second time by at least one of two independent raters to confirm reliability. The first 
author was an advanced graduate student in Psychology with completed graduate coursework 
training. The two independent coders were undergraduate research assistants with extensive 
coursework in psychology and research experience. All coded variables included in the final 
analysis had satisfactory or better (i.e., k > .6) agreement. 
Mediation Analysis Plan 
 As noted earlier, a subset of our data includes a measure of ease-of-retrieval in addition to 
a dependent measure of interest, and therefore it permits statistical tests of mediation. Mediation 
analysis provides a computational method for decomposing the total effect (c) into indirect (a x 
b) and direct (c') effects, given the assumption that a variable, M, causally mediates the 
relationship between an independent variable, X, and a dependent variable, Y (Baron and Kenny, 
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1986; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010; see Figure 2).9 These 
estimates quantify the qualitative relationships depicted in Figure 1. 
The traditional explanation in the standard paradigm is that subjective ease mediates the 
ease-of-retrieval effect (Schwarz, 2004). In terms of the mediation model depicted in Figure 2, a 
and b should be large if the traditional explanation holds. More specifically, the traditional 
explanation suggests that subjective ease should fully mediate the effect, which implies that the 
indirect effect, a x b should be much larger than the direct effect, c'. At a minimum, the 
traditional explanation predicts that the indirect effect should be significantly positive. If the 
direct effect is found to be substantial (e.g., as large as the indirect effect and significantly 
different than zero), then traditional explanation is inadequate insofar as a substantial direct 
effect suggests that one or more mediators, other than subjective ease, are involved. In the 
moderated paradigm, the mediation should be disrupted (i.e., indirect effect should be reduced) 
or some other mediator should exert a stronger influence than feelings of ease (i.e., direct effect 
should be increased).   
 For every triplet of effect sizes (rXM, rMY, and rXY) obtained from the literature or directly 
from the authors, standardized regression coefficients were computed based on the traditional 
mediation equations with subjective ease as the mediator of the effect of the few-versus-many 
manipulation on the dependent measure of interest (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Cohen, Cohen, West, 
& Aiken, 2003). These equations are: 
                                                
9 One area of possible debate is whether subjective ease is a “manipulation check” or a measure of an explanatory 
construct; we argue it is the latter. Although many studies report measures of subjective ease as a manipulation 
check, we believe "manipulation check" is a misnomer because subjective ease is a mediating psychological 
construct. Further, Fiedler et al. (2011) present simulation evidence that manipulation checks should not 
significantly mediate the dependent measure of interest. Following this, if subjective ease is found to often pass the 
mediation test, then our claim that subjective ease is a measure of a mediator, not a manipulation check, is 
supported. 
	
 25 
 
 a = rXM (1) 
 b = (rMY – rXY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2) (2) 
 c' = (rXY – rMY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2) (3) 
 
We did not obtain rMY or estimate mediation models for studies using spotlight analyses 
due to the difficulty of obtaining a meaningful correlation at one standard deviation above and 
below another factor.10  
 
Results 
Literature Search 
A total of 152 papers, published and unpublished, were found that employed the few-
versus-many manipulation. As of the time of this article, no replications with publicly available 
results were available on PsychFileDrawer or the Open Science Framework/Reproducibility 
Project.11 There were 121 published papers, 23 dissertations and theses12, and eight unpublished 
papers (two studies were left out from a published paper, and 17 studies came from seven 
unpublished manuscripts). These 152 papers contained 284 studies. One study was excluded for 
using a within-subject design (Corby & Homa, 2011, study 2). Other studies and conditions were 
excluded due to insufficient statistical information (e.g., Corby & Homa, 2011; Florack & Zoabi, 
2003; Frederick & Mochon, 2012; Hermann et al., 2002; Hirt et al., 2004; Kivetz & Zhang, 
2006; Lee, 2005; Ofir, 2000; Sackett, 2006; Sanna & Schwarz, 2004; Tormala et al., 2002, study 
                                                
10	We thank John Lynch, Jr., for his advice on this topic.	
11 However, a study from Stephen and Pham (2008) was under processing (yet not conducted as of initial 
submission) in the OpenScience framework database. 
12 We e-mailed 92 authors who had available contact information and were the common links across multiple 
papers, of whom 64 (69.57%) responded. 
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3; Walton & Cohen, 2007; Wehr, 2010, Study 1; Yahalom & Schul, 2013), as specified above. 
These exclusions left 142 papers and 263 studies. Comprehensive tables with effect sizes and 
descriptions of studies can be found in Appendix B. The data file can be found in the 
Supplemental Materials. 
Of the 142 papers, there were 263 studies that yielded 582 effect sizes (i.e., observations 
in the database): these 582 effect sizes were composed of 454 proximal and 128 distal.13 Of these 
454 proximal observations, 298 were categorized as standard paradigm observations, and 156 as 
moderated paradigm observations. The distal observations were composed of 92 standard 
paradigm and 36 moderated paradigm observations. For our mediation tests, we had 209 triplets 
of rXM, rMY, and rXY, 165 from proximal data (of which 143 were from the standard paradigm)  
and 44 from distal data (of which 31 were from the standard paradigm). 
A descriptive set of statistics for the 582 effect sizes split into proximal and distal can be 
found in Table 2. 
Total Effect Analyses (c = rXY) 
 Overall effect size. All reported analyses of effect sizes and regression models used a 
two-level meta-analytic model with random intercepts for papers (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; 
see Singer, 1998 for a similar model). We use a restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
method (Littell et al., 2006). The dependent variable was the Fisher z transform of rXY, and all 
predictors were standardized. We report the mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals in 
Table 3. 
                                                
13	We also analyze our results excluding the two papers from the proximal analyses that are heavily weighed by our 
estimation method: Yeager & Krosnick’s studies, which have several hundred participants per cell (larger than any 
other study), and Bares’ (2007) dissertation from which has more observations than for any other paper were 
gathered. Removal of these papers does not affect our overall effect sizes drastically (Standard: r = .258; Moderated: 
r = -.181; Overall: r = .125). 
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We first examine the proximal effect sizes. As shown in Table 3, the mean effect size for 
the standard paradigm was positive, rXY = .253, 95% CI [.224, .281], t(110) = 17.05, p < .001), 
and the mean effect size for the moderated paradigm was negative, rXY = -.178 (95% CI [-.215, -
.140], t(52) = -9.27, p < .001). Both the standard and moderated paradigms rejected the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity based on Cochran’s Q (standard: Q(297) = 720.795, p < .001; I2 = 
58.80%, 95% CI [53.19%, 63.73%]; moderated: Q(155) = 202.26, p = .006; I2 = 23.37%, 95% CI 
[5.85%, 37.62%]). An !" value corresponds to the proportion of total variation attributable to 
true heterogeneity and not sampling error; we caution, however, that it does not represent 
absolute heterogeneity (Borenstein et al., 2009; Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Huedo-Medina et 
al., 2006). We also observe a grand mean effect size of the combined (i.e., standard and 
moderated together) dataset14 of rXY = .121 (95% CI [.094, .149]; t(113) = 8.79, p < .001; Q(453) 
= 1395.33, p < .001; I2 = 67.53%, 95% CI [64.23%, 70.53%]). We present the distribution of the 
individual proximal effect sizes in each paradigm in Figure 3. For the standard paradigm, 91% of 
observations are greater than zero. For the moderated paradigm, 83% of observations are less 
than or equal to zero. 
We next turn to the distal effect sizes, which are depicted in Figure 4 for the standard 
(panel A) and moderated (panel B) paradigms. 96% of the standard paradigm observations are 
greater than zero, whereas 67% of the moderated observations are at or below zero. The standard 
paradigm again had a positive mean effect size (rXY = .264, 95% CI [.221, .307]; t(41) = 11.79, p 
< .001; Q(91) = 117.82, p = .031; I2 = 22.76%, 95% CI [0%, 40.86%]), whereas the moderated 
paradigm had a negative mean effect size (rXY = -.082, 95% CI [-.158, -.005]; t(19) = -2.23, p = 
                                                
14	Alternative strategies yield similar results in proximal for nesting within studies (Standard: r = .254; Moderated: r 
= -.183; Overall: r = .102) and within clusters of authors (Standard: r = .232, Moderated: r = -.174; Overall: r = 
.117), where clusters were defined as sets of frequent co-authors.  
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.038; Q(35) = 53.075, p = .026; I2 = 34.06%, 95% CI [0.75%, 56.18%]). The combined dataset 
again had a slightly positive effect size (rXY = .164, 95% CI [.128, .201]; t(44) = 8.96, p < .001; 
Q(127) = 282.10, p < .001; I2 = 54.98%, 95% CI [45.05%, 63.12%]). 
Publication bias. We investigated publication bias using both trim-and-fill and PET-
PEESE methods (Duval & Tweedie, 2000; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). Both methods 
suggest that publication bias may reduce the ease-of-retrieval effect by up to one-third in 
magnitude in the standard paradigm (and reduce the moderated paradigm by about a fifth). 
However, the null hypothesis that the true effect size is 0 is still rejected after adjusting for 
publication bias. 
Funnel plots based on trim-and-fill analyses15 for effect sizes from standard paradigm, 
moderated paradigm, and combined datasets for proximal effect sizes are provided in Figure 5. 
In Panel A, the funnel depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the 
trim-and-fill algorithm. In Panel B, the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the 
trim-and-fill algorithm. In Panel C, the funnel depicts alpha contours assuming the null 
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true (white indicates non-significant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey 
p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01). The standard paradigm had 88 potentially-missing 
observations imputed by trim-and-fill for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in 
its confidence interval (r = .159, 95% CI [.137, .181], z = 13.78, p < .001; Q(385) = 983.37, p < 
.001). Many of the imputed, potentially missing effect sizes (white circles in Figure 5B), 
however, occur in regions of statistical non-significance (p > .10, white), while fewer imputed 
effect sizes are in regions of marginal (.05 < p < .10, light grey) or traditional (.01 < p < .05, 
                                                
15	One difficulty with funnel plots is that missing studies may occur due to multiple reasons, inclusive of non-
significant results or small study effects. We employ contour-enhanced funnel plots, which illustrate the regions in 
which studies are statistically significant. These contours help indicate whether studies are missing from areas of the 
chart in which the effect sizes would emerge from non-significant studies (Palmer et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2008).	
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darker grey; p < .01, outside the funnel) statistical significance. So, the asymmetry in the funnel 
is more likely to be due to publication bias than from other elements such as variance in study 
quality for smaller-sample studies (Palmer et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2008). In the moderated 
paradigm, no studies were filled in (r = -.177, 95% CI [-.206, -.147], z = -11.34, p < .001; Q(155) 
= 202.26, p = .006). In the combined dataset, only 33 potentially-missing studies were filled in 
for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in its confidence interval (r = .080, 95% 
CI [.054, .105], z = 6.01, p < .001, Q(486) = 1625.62, p < .001). 
Analogous trim-and-fill funnel plots for the distal effect sizes can be found in Figure 6. 
The standard paradigm had 31 potentially-missing observations imputed by trim-and-fill for an 
adjusted effect size estimate that also did not have 0 in its confidence interval (r = .188, 95% CI 
[.154, .221], z = 10.59, p < .001; Q(122) = 222.75, p < .001). In the moderated paradigm, 8 
studies were filled in (r = -.013, 95% CI [-.078, .052], z = -0.387, p = .699; Q(43) = 84.61, p < 
.001). In this case, the moderated paradigm became nonsignificantly different from zero. 
However, given the effect sizes in the moderated paradigm are garnered from studies intended to 
attenuate or reverse the effect, this result is not troublesome. In the combined dataset, only 18 
potentially-missing studies were filled in for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 
in its confidence interval (r = .132, 95% CI [.092, .172], z = 6.39, p < .001, Q(145) = 373.98, p < 
.001). 
Our PET-PEESE results on proximal effect sizes similarly suggest a downward 
correction of the effect size to account for publication bias. For the standard paradigm, the results 
of PET suggest a new effect size of r = .104 (95% CI [.034, .172], t(110) = 2.95, p = .004), while 
PEESE points to a more modest correction to r = .193 (95% CI [.153, .232], t(110) = 9.51, p < 
.001). Given that we reject the null hypothesis for PET (that the intercept is equal to 0), the value 
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from PEESE is generally recommended (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 
2014). This adjusted value is almost a fourth reduction in the effect size and is less extreme than 
the trim-and-fill estimate, so only a fraction of the effect may be explained by publication bias. 
Our moderated paradigm results yield similar conclusions from PET (r = -.162, 95% CI [-.276, -
.043], t(52) = -2.72, p = .009) and PEESE (r = -.179, 95% CI[-.237, -.120], t(52) = -5.99, p < 
.001). We again opt for the PEESE estimate based on the PET-PEESE rule to select PEESE if 
PET is significantly different from 0 (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 
2014). On the combined dataset, we see a PET estimate of r = .111 (95% CI [.034, .188], t(113) 
= 2.84, p = .005) and a PEESE estimate of r = .121 (95% CI [.078, .164], t(113) = 5.57, p < 
.001). Therefore, we see a non-zero effect with PET-PEESE (thus we opt for PEESE), but the 
effect sizes warrant an adjustment towards zero from where they were originally. 
Analyses on the distal effect sizes yield divergent results from trim-and-fill. The 
estimates for the standard paradigm for PET (r = .02, 95% CI [-.077, .115], t(41) = 0.40, p = 
.692) are nonsignificant; the same was true for the moderated paradigm (r = .053, 95% CI [-.254, 
365], t(19) = 0.35, p = .727). The combined dataset also had a nonsignificant value for PET (r = 
.069, 95% CI [-.048, .184], t(44) = 1.19, p = .241). Although the PEESE values for the standard 
(r = .140, 95% CI [.081, .198], t(41) = 4.76, p < .001), moderated (r = -.011, 95% CI [-.173, 
.151], t(19) = -0.14, p = .89), and combined (r = .109, 95% CI [.041, .176], t(44) = 3.22, p = 
.002) datasets were significantly different from zero, we must default to the PET values.  
Summarizing, for the studies using distal effect sizes, which makes up a minority of the 
overall data, it is plausible that the true effect size is not significantly different from zero.  
However, for studies using proximal effect sizes, which are a majority of the overall data, there 
is evidence of publication bias (that may adjust the effect size downward by about a third or a 
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fourth), but it is unlikely that the ease-of-retrieval effect is solely due to publication bias for two 
reasons. First, in the standard and moderated paradigm analyses, both trim-and-fill and PEESE 
find the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is far from 0 relative to the mean 
(Borenstein et al., 2009). Second, for the standard paradigm, many studies were potentially-
missing from regions of non-significance in the contour trim-and-fill, suggesting that a file-
drawer effect is likely.  
Finally, we note that trim-and-fill techniques have been challenged in the literature 
(Johnson & Eagly, 2014; Terrin et al., 2003), so we acknowledge that the results should be 
accepted with some caution. On the other hand, our results are not as susceptible to these 
criticisms as they might be because we greatly reduce one source of bias in the trim-and-fill 
estimation method (i.e., heterogeneity) by separating the analysis by paradigm and type of 
dependent measure in addition to presenting the combined results. 
Moderator Analyses  
 Table 4 presents analyses for the total effect sizes (rXY) based on the combined dataset (N 
= 454) and the standard paradigm data only for the proximal paradigm (N = 298) using both a 
bivariate regression model for each moderator considered separately and a multiple regression 
model that includes all moderators. We find no concerns with collinearity diagnostics for these 
predictors.  Each predictors’ variance inflation factor (VIF) was below 10 for both the combined 
dataset (maximum VIF = 1.56) and the standard paradigm data (maximum VIF = 1.44), and the 
maximum condition index was below 30 (Cohen et al., 2003; 2.26 for the combined dataset and 
2.12 for the standard paradigm data). The same holds true for Table 5, which depicts the same 
analyses for the combined dataset (N = 128, maximum VIF = 2.33, maximum condition index = 
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3.16) and standard paradigm data (N = 92, maximum VIF = 2.14, maximum condition index = 
2.99) for distal effect sizes.   
Salience Moderators. Regarding the salience moderators, we find a strong negative 
effect of having a polarized attitude associated with lower effect sizes. This result is consistent 
with extant theory suggesting ease to be less prominent for those individuals (Greifeneder, Bless, 
& Pham, 2011). However, we find little impact of increased range or attention (via placement of 
the subjective ease question, contrary to Kühnen, 2010), even in the standard paradigm.  
Inference Moderators. Regarding the inference moderators, there were strong effects of 
manipulations of processing motivation (both depth and involvement), misattribution, and 
disposition. Manipulations of processing motivation that increased processing depth were 
negatively related to effect sizes for proximal, which is consistent with systematic processing 
reducing reliance on ease. For involvement-based manipulations of processing motivation, we 
observe a small increase in effect size when involvement is high (and decrease with lower 
involvement). That is, consistent with Tormala et al. (2002), individuals who have greater 
involvement with an issue may rely on higher order thoughts and feelings as a heuristic to 
judgment. With respect to representativeness, we find that misattribution paradigms, which alert 
participants to task difficulty being non-informative for judgment, clearly reduce (and reverse) 
effect sizes. Finally, with respect to relevance based on disposition, we find that people who are 
predisposed to use feelings for judgment have larger effect sizes for proximal effect sizes. 
However, we also find two results that are inconsistent with our predictions for the 
inference moderators. First, we observe a reversal of our expected result for the target of 
retrieval. Retrieving information about the self reduces rather than increases effect sizes in the 
standard paradigm for proximal effect sizes. Further, we do not find evidence supporting the 
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claim that making judgments about yourself leads to larger effect sizes. In fact, we find a reversal 
in the standard paradigm for proximal effect sizes.  
 Exploratory Methodological Moderators. Regarding the exploratory methodological 
moderators, we only observe a strong effect for publication status. Unpublished studies have 
lower effect sizes than published studies. This result holds both for the combined dataset and for 
the standard paradigm data for both proximal and distal effect sizes. However, aside from 
publication status, we do not see consistent results across bivariate and multiple regression 
models on whether other facets of the dependent measures (e.g., number of measures, type of 
measure) have an impact on effect sizes.  
Mediation Analyses: Indirect and Direct Effects  
 Of the 582 values of rXY in the total database, 253 also had associated values of rXM and 
rMY.  For each of these triplets, standardized regression coefficients from the mediation models, 
as defined in Equations 1 - 3, were used to compute estimates of the indirect effect (a x b) and 
the direct effect (c'). These estimates were analyzed without transformation.16 
Standard Paradigm. The usual explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect predicts that 
the indirect effect (a x b) should be large, which we find. The standard paradigm data show 
partial mediation of the effect through subjective ease. For the standard paradigm data for 
proximal effect sizes, the average indirect (a x b) effect was .114 (95% CI [.074, .154]; t(56) = 
5.68, p < .001; Q(142) = 166.916, p = .075; !" = 14.93%, 95% CI [0%, 31.64%]). However, the 
average direct effect (c') was similar in size, .105 (95% CI [.064, .145]; t(56) = 5.19, p < . 001; 
Q(142) = 278.555, p < .001; !" = 49.02%, 95% CI [38.06%, 58.04%]), and the medians were .08 
and .12 for indirect and direct effects, respectively. This indicates that subjective ease does not 
                                                
16 Unlike bivariate correlations, standardized regression coefficients from multiple correlations (i.e., b and c') are 
not bounded by -1 and +1, so skewness is less of a concern.  	
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fully mediate the ease-of-retrieval effect. Moreover, because the direct effect (c') is positive, it 
cannot be due to numerosity or evidence strength, which would otherwise yield a negative effect. 
Thus, the results of the analysis of mediation model estimates is mixed. The standard explanation 
is supported, but the large direct effect is unexplained by the constructs typically discussed in 
this literature. 
However, distal standard paradigm effect sizes do not show much evidence of mediation 
by ease. The indirect effect was .046 (95% CI [-.029, .121], t(15) = 1.32, p =.208; Q(30) = 
54.722, p = .004; I2 = 45.18%, 95% CI [16.25%, 64.11%]) and the direct effect was .208 (95% 
CI [.144, .272], t(15) = 6.96, p < .001; Q(30) = 56.751, p = .002; I2 = 47.14%, 95% CI [19.52%, 
65.28%]). The much larger size of the direct effect, and the relative lack of mediation by ease is 
consistent again with the conceptualization of distal effect sizes as requiring an additional step 
between ease and the dependent measure of interest. 
Combined Dataset. For the proximal effect sizes combined dataset, the standard 
explanation was also supported: the indirect effect was .096 (95% CI [.060, .132], t(56) = 5.34, p 
< .001; Q(208) = 182.149, p = .902; I2 = 0%). The direct effect (c') was .019 (95% CI [-.105, 
.053], t(56) = 1.14, p = .259; Q(208) = 450.362, p < .001; I2 = 53.81%, 95% CI [45.96%, 
60.53%]).  However, the combined data includes a mix of standard and moderated paradigm 
data.  As is discussed in the next section, the direct effects for the moderated paradigm are 
negative, so when pooled with the positive direct effects of the moderated paradigm, the result is 
an average direct effect near zero.  For the distal effect sizes combined dataset, we observe an 
indirect effect of .034 (95% CI [-.020, .087], t(17) = 1.32, p = .203; Q(43) = 57.185, p = .072; I2 
= 24.81%, 95% CI [0%, 48.52%]), and a direct effect of .112 (95% CI [.034, .191], t(17) = 3.02, 
p = .008; Q(43) = 116.093, p < .001; I2 = 18.98%, 95% CI [0%, 44.64%]). As compared to the 
 35 
indirect effect, the direct effect was much larger for the distal effect sizes, which is consistent 
with the distal model’s operationalization as requiring another non-ease explanation between 
ease and dependent measure. Moderated Paradigm. For the moderated paradigm, the average 
direct effect is negative. For proximal effect sizes’ moderated paradigm data, the average effect 
size of the direct effect (c') is -.205 (95% CI [-.273, -.137]; t(25) = -6.18, p < .001, Q(65) = 
84.174, p = .055, !" = 22.78%, 95% CI [0%, 43.55%]), which is a reversal of the ease effect, and 
is consistent with numerosity or evidence strength. However, the indirect (a x b) effect for these 
proximal effect sizes was significantly greater than zero, .042 (95% CI [.010, .073]; t(25) = 2.75, 
p = .011, Q(65) = 14.216, ns; I2 = 0%), which suggests that some ease-related effect is present, 
but is too small to overcome the negative direct effect created by the moderator manipulation. On 
the other hand, for the distal effect sizes, the indirect effect was .002 (95% CI [-.034, .037], t(8) 
= 0.11, p = .92; Q(12) = 1.632, ns; I2 = 0%) and the direct effect was -.121 (95% CI [-.232, -
.010], t(8) = -2.51, p = .036; Q(12) = 15.005, p = .241), which again demonstrates that there is 
little evidence of mediation by ease for distal effect sizes.  
Mediation Analyses: Moderators of the Indirect and Direct Effects 
 Tables 6 and 7 present moderator results for indirect (a x b) and direct (c') effects for 
triplets pooled over the standard and moderated paradigms for proximal and distal, respectively 
(see tables in Appendix C for standard paradigm moderator results). As a reference point, Tables 
6 and 7 also present estimates of the total effect (c).  
For salience moderators, we observe three results. Range has little effect, polarized 
attitudes moderate all effects, and attention has little or no effect. 
For inference moderators, all moderators except involvement affect the direct effect for 
proximal effect sizes, suggesting they invoke non-ease processes. Representativeness based on 
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retrieval target affected the direct effect as well for proximal, but it affected the indirect effect for 
distal effect sizes. Thus, the overall pattern of estimated coefficients is consistent with 
explanations that require new mediators that are typically not measured, or even identified, in the 
ease-of-retrieval literature. 
Interpreting Mediation Results: Heterogeneity, Measurement Error, and Correlated Error 
The results of the mediation portion of this meta-analysis are more complex than the 
single effect size analysis for rXY. That is, examining a histogram of all observations, plus means, 
and statistics such as I2 provides a good assessment of both the effect and the amount of 
heterogeneity in effect size for rXY.  However, when the unit of observation is a triplet of 
correlations that have implications for assessing mediation (i.e., indirect and direct effects), the 
interpretation of results is much more complicated (see Albarracin et al., 2000).   
Two complications, heterogeneity and the statistical assumptions of mediation models, 
are particularly important. First, regarding heterogeneity, there can be dense, multidimensional 
clusters of points that are not evident in the marginal distributions of each measure considered 
separately. Importantly, the marginal means (or medians) of each measure may not be 
representative of any specific cluster or even any individual observation. We are particularly 
interested in the estimates of indirect (a x b) and direct effects (c') for the standard paradigm 
because the consensus in the literature is that mediation by subjective ease should be robustly 
evident in this paradigm. Indeed, "full mediation" is often implied, and other potential mediators 
are seldom discussed (i.e., the indirect effect should be much larger than the direct effect). We 
examined mediation heterogeneity using the simplest methods described in Hutchinson, 
Kamakura, and Lynch (2000). Figure 8 (Panel A) displays each observation from the standard 
paradigm (where mediation is most likely) plotted using the indirect and direct effects as 
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coordinates (black markers for proximal effect sizes, gray markers for distal effect sizes). 
Although the central tendencies are positive, as expected, for the indirect effects (mean = .10, 
median = .07) and the direct effects (mean = .13, median = .14), there is considerable 
heterogeneity, as indicated by the size of the scatterplot.  Moreover, visual inspection of Figure 8 
(confirmed by k-means clustering) reveals three clusters: (1) a dense region just above the 45-
degree, which reflects the presence of both direct and indirect effects with the former being 
slightly larger, (2) a diffuse region above and left of the first, which reflects large direct effects 
and near zero indirect effects, and (3) a diffuse region below and right of the first, which reflects 
large indirect effects and near zero direct effects. Only the third cluster contains triplets that 
might be called full mediation. The k-means cluster analysis revealed that this third cluster 
includes only 27% of the observations; however, as might be expected, 98% of this cluster are 
proximal. 
Hutchinson et al. (2000) recommend simply counting the number of observations 
consistent with a hypothesis as a straightforward way to mitigate aggregation biases due to 
heterogeneity. One simple test of consistency with full mediation is the number of observations 
for which the indirect effect is larger than the direct effect. Note that this is a rather weak test that 
favors full mediation. As can be seen in Table 8 this inequality holds for only 47% of proximal 
effect sizes and 13% of distal effect sizes. A simple test of mediation of any size that is 
consistent with the traditional explanation of the ease-or-retrieval effect is the number of 
observations for which the indirect effect is positive. Here the evidence is much stronger: 80% 
for proximal effect sizes and 74% for distal effect sizes. Overall, these analyses of heterogeneity 
suggest that some level of mediation is often present, but that mediation is the dominant 
explanation of the total effect for a relatively small set of proximal observations. Similarly, a 
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positive direct, which suggests another mediator is influential, is often present (71% of proximal 
observations and 90% of distal observations; see Table 8). However, the direct effect is the 
dominant explanation of the total effect for a relatively small set of observations (about 13% of 
observations based on the k-means cluster analysis, of which 65% are proximal). Most 
observations (about 60%) are consistent with multiple mediators. Thus, while ease often partially 
mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect, that is far from the whole story. 
The second complication is that the assumptions of traditional mediation analyses may 
not hold and, if not, the resulting effect size estimates will be biased. Most published mediation 
analyses in the psychological literature have adopted an OLS regression model in which 
independent (X), dependent (Y), and mediator (M) variables are all treated as fixed effects (e.g., 
Baron & Kenny, 1986). Many methodologists have pointed out that this approach entails several 
very strong assumptions that are unlikely to be true (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; 
MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Two assumptions are 
especially problematic: no measurement error for M and uncorrelated error between M and Y.  
Figure 7 extends the simple mediation model depicted in Figure 2 to depict measurement error 
and correlated error. Measurement error in M creates a negative bias in the OLS estimate of b 
and a positive bias in c'.  For example, even if the true direct effect is zero, OLS will estimate c' 
to be greater than zero because X can compensate for the measurement error in M. In contrast, 
correlated error in M and Y (usually assumed to be due to some unmeasured confounding 
variable; i.e., C in Figure 7) creates a positive bias in the OLS estimate of b and a negative bias 
in c'. Thus, the two problematic aspects of error structure have opposite effects.  Thus, the 
magnitude of the combined bias is less than would be the case if measurement error and 
correlated error had directionally consistent biases.  However, it is important to note that it is 
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highly unlikely that the two biases will exactly cancel out.  Moreover, the direction of the 
combined bias is unknown, so OLS estimates of the indirect effect could be either overestimates 
or underestimates (see Fritz, Kenny, and MacKinnon, 2016, for a more detail discussion). 
For the ease-of-retrieval effect, plausible confounding variables include response style 
(e.g., Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012) and halo 
effects (e.g., people who feel they are very assertive also feel that all tasks are easy for them).  
None of the potential remedies for these biases that are discussed in the literature are possible for 
this meta-analysis because the only available data are the three correlations among the 
variables.17  Thus, the interpretation of our results for mediation triplets depends on the 
assumptions one is willing to make about error structure for M and Y.  It is important to note, 
however, that because of random assignment to the levels of X, the total effect, rXY, is unaffected 
by either measurement error or correlated error for M.  So, it is not the ease-of-retrieval effect, 
but the explanation of the effect, that is at risk and dependent on strong assumptions.   
To assess the potential biases due to error structure, we adjusted the estimates of the 
indirect and direct effects using the approach recently described by Fritz, Kenny, and 
MacKinnon (2014, 2016; see Appendix D).18 Figure 8 (Panel B) displays a plot of adjusted effect 
sizes for the standard paradigm. Table 8 reports medians and heterogeneity measures for 
standard paradigm effect sizes that were adjusted for measurement error in M only, adjusted for 
correlated error between M and Y only, and adjusted for both types of error biases.  It is 
important to note that these adjustments, although based on the literature, do not necessarily 
                                                
17	Recommendations for avoiding these biases include more sophisticated estimation methods (e.g., structural 
equation models, instrumental variable methods, principal stratification, and inverse probability weighting; see 
MacKinnon & Pirlott, 2015) and experimental manipulations of the mediator (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010).			
18	We thank Matthew Fritz and David MacKinnon for comments and advice regarding our application of their 
results.  Of course, we are solely responsible for the analyses, including any errors they might contain.	
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provide better estimates of the "true" effect sizes.  The value of examining the adjusted estimates 
is in understanding the extent to which these biases might change our conclusions and the extent 
to which are conclusions are robust with respect to these possible biases.  Ultimately, each bias 
acting alone changed the effect sizes in the direction consistent with our earlier discussion: 
adjusting for measure error made the indirect effect stronger and adjusting for correlated error 
made the indirect effect weaker. When both were present at plausible levels, the indirect effect 
was weakened.  Thus, although our earlier analysis of mediation based on traditional OLS 
methods suggested that the direct and indirect effects were about the same in size for proximal 
data (see Table 3), our analyses of heterogeneity and error structure (see Table 8) strongly 
suggest that the indirect effect is smaller than the direct effect most of the time. However, none 
of the adjustments reversed or even challenged our earlier conclusions that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in viable explanations and that, while ease often partially mediates the ease-of-
retrieval effect, full mediation is rare. Thus, "ease of retrieval" is far from the whole story, even 
for proximal data collected using the standard paradigm. 
General Discussion 
 People do not always employ fact-based evidence to make decisions (Albarracin et al., 
2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Many 
research traditions have investigated alternatives to the effortful evaluation of objective evidence, 
including use of quick heuristics (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1993), reducing negative emotions (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998), and thinking less 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). A large research stream posits that people use how 
they feel about something as an input to judgment: the feelings-as-information framework 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988). In this tradition, affective feelings, cognitive feelings, and bodily 
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experiences such as facial feedback inform the decision-making process (Greifeneder, Bless, & 
Pham, 2007; Schwarz, & Clore, 2007; Stepper & Strack, 1993).  
This meta-analysis examined a frequent instantiation of the impact of cognitive, the ease-
of-retrieval effect, and the results have clear implications for the more general question of how 
feelings are used in judgment. In the ease-of-retrieval effect, individuals generate varying 
numbers of examples of content and are hypothesized to employ feelings of ease experienced in 
this task instead of alternative inputs to judgment (Schwarz et al., 1991). 
 We analyzed 582 effect sizes from 263 studies in 142 papers. These effect sizes were 
based on dependent measures that were either proximal (N = 454) or distal (N = 128) in their 
hypothesized relationship to subjective ease. 298 proximal and 92 distal effect sizes were from 
experimental conditions using the standard paradigm (i.e., authors were attempting to 
conceptually replicate the original effect reported by Schwarz et al., 1991); 156 proximal and 36 
distal effect sizes were from experimental conditions using moderated paradigms in which 
authors were attempting to reduce or reverse the ease-of-retrieval effect. Additionally, we were 
able to conduct mediation analyses for 209 proximal and 44 distal effect sizes, decomposing 
each total effect into an indirect (a x b) and a direct (c') effect.  
 The results of our analyses have several implications for feelings-as-information theory 
and for metacognition, in general.  We focus on the implications from the proximal paradigm 
because they represent results under “ideal conditions” for demonstrating that cognitive feelings 
are a mediating mechanism.  
First, on average, the standard paradigm exhibits a robust, medium-sized effect (rXY = .25 
for proximal, .26 for distal) of the few-versus-many manipulation on a wide variety of judgment 
tasks. Publication bias was found to be present. We estimate that it reduces the average effect 
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size by about one third or a fourth in the standard paradigm for proximal data, leaving most of 
the effect to be explained by other factors. Therefore, we find robust evidence that inductions of 
a cognitive feeling (i.e., subjective ease) influences judgment.  
Second, about half of the ease-of-retrieval effect in standard paradigms that use proximal 
dependent measures is mediated by subjective ease when the traditional OLS mediation model is 
used to estimate indirect and direct effects (on average, a x b = .11 and c' = .11, see Table 3). 
This supports the standard explanation of the effect and presents convincing evidence of the use 
of feelings as inputs to judgment. However, it also suggests that other mediators are commonly 
present, but seldom identified. The standard explanation survived analyses that incorporated 
heterogeneity, measurement error, and correlated error. However, the estimated size of the 
indirect was further reduced in these analyses, while the estimated direct effect was increased. 
This mediation analysis serves as a call to action for researchers to find new theories and 
experimental paradigms that will explicate the robust, and unexplained, direct effect uncovered 
in this meta-analysis. Finally, studies characterized as distal based on having measures being less 
directly connected to ease had a far smaller indirect effect in the standard paradigm, supporting 
the distinction between proximal and distal. 
Third, for moderated paradigms for proximal effect sizes, the indirect effect is much 
smaller than for the standard paradigm (but still significantly positive), and the direct effect is 
negative and larger in magnitude. These results strongly suggest that other mediators are at work 
in the moderated paradigm.  
Fourth, several moderators were found to contribute to variations in effect size (see Table 
4).  Importantly, five moderators were designed to represent the types of moderators of feelings-
as-information posited elsewhere in the literature (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011), which 
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appeared as manipulations in the moderated paradigms. Thus, they inform us both about the 
operation of feelings as information and possible explanations of the observed differences 
between the standard and moderated paradigms. All five moderators were found to account for 
significant amounts of the variation in effect sizes in the total database.  
For salience moderators (i.e., those affecting the experience and accessibility of 
subjective ease), we found two important results: one positive and one null. Polarized attitudes 
reduced the ease-of-retrieval effect. For these participants who had competing inputs to ease 
(e.g., a polarized attitude for politics; e.g., Haddock, 2002), effect sizes were negative. However, 
contrary to what Kühnen (2010) argues, we found only a small, non-significant effect of the 
subjective ease question appearing before the dependent measure (versus after or no question) in 
any dataset.  
For inference moderators (i.e., those affecting the relationship between ease and the 
dependent measure), we found several important results for proximal effect sizes. Manipulations 
of processing motivation that increased processing depth (but were not related to involvement) 
reduced effect sizes, which is suggestive that increased cognitive resources made systematic 
processing strategies more likely (Chaiken et al., 1989). However, manipulations of processing 
motivation that increased involvement were positively related to the ease-of-retrieval effect, 
which is consistent with the Tormala et al. (2002) framework. Participants who have heightened 
personal relevance may be more cognizant of their higher order feelings. Further, 
representativeness (misattribution) reduced the ease-of-retrieval effect, consistent with the 
hypothesized reduced informativeness of cognitive feelings (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011). 
Finally, people predisposed toward using cognitive feelings exhibited larger ease-of-retrieval 
effects.   
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Fifth, when the indirect and direct effect sizes were analyzed separately, many 
moderators were found to affect one, but not the other (see Tables 6 and 7). For salience 
moderators of proximal effect sizes, the polarized attitude moderator influenced the indirect and 
direct effect sizes. In contrast, the inference moderators affected direct effect sizes much more 
than indirect effect sizes for proximal effect sizes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
moderator manipulations used in the literature achieved their results mainly by introducing new 
mediators that had effects opposite to those of subjective ease.  
Sixth, two moderators that were based on degree of self-reference (i.e., representativeness 
[retrieval target] and relevance [judgment task]) were not consistent with our initial predictions 
and were reversed for the standard paradigm for proximal effect sizes. This result may mean that 
these moderators are less related to representativeness and relevance, but instead function 
similarly to depth of processing motivation. That is, self-referential retrieval and judgment may 
encourage more systematic processing (Chaiken et al., 1989).  
 Finally, we find few methodological factors that have a large influence on proximal or 
distal effect sizes. That the ease-of-retrieval effect is robust across these manipulations supports 
the usefulness of the manipulation in the span of inductions of cognitive feelings to be used as 
information, and it diminishes concerns about other possible methodological artifacts. 
Methodological Implications for Few-Versus-Many Studies 
Our meta-analysis also has implications for ease-of-retrieval studies in the future, 
inclusive of the way the few-versus-many manipulation is conducted.  
First, while our work suggests no aggregate differences between whether the ease 
question is placed before or after the dependent measure, there may be reason to place the 
question after the dependent measure to avoid demand characteristics explanations (Kühnen, 
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2010). In some situations, however, there may be theory-driven reasons for including the ease 
question before the dependent measure (e.g., salience; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; see 
also Danziger et al., 2005). Therefore, the exact placement of this question should consider both 
concerns. However, we also recommend that studies that manipulate the placement of the ease 
question explicitly test whether the placement influences the results in a specific paper (see 
Feldman & Lynch, 1988). 
Second, we recommend increased sample sizes to increase power. In a simple two-cell 
design, given our effect size, an experimenter would need to run approximately 58 participants 
per cell for proximal and 53 for distal to achieve a power of .8. In the standard paradigm for the 
proximal model in this meta-analysis, we find that, when excluding the largest designs (N > 
300), an average of 25 participants are run per cell, which would only be powered at .45 for each 
two-cell comparison. In the distal paradigm, there were only 30 participants per cell, leading to a 
power estimate of .56. We recognize that we reduced power by splitting designs by moderators 
and that, in many cases, the full ANOVA had more statistical power than disaggregated two-cell 
comparisons due to pooled estimates of the error term (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000). 
However, as illustrated by our meta-analyses, splitting data into standard and moderated 
paradigms enables informative tests of mediation. 
Broader Implications of this Meta-Analysis 
 This meta-analysis arrives at an important time within the fields of social psychology, 
consumer behavior, and judgment and decision-making. Many well-known effects are being re-
visited because of failures to replicate (e.g., behavioral priming; Doyen et al., 2012; Harris et al., 
2013; Rohrer et al., 2015; Shanks et al., 2013), and many researchers are engaging in debates 
over the existence of published effects (e.g., choice overload: Chernev, Bockenholt, & Goodman, 
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2015; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010; unconscious thought theory: Nieuwenstein et 
al., 2015). Due to these challenges, many authors of previously published effects are reluctant to 
provide information, data, or even communicate about their prior work. The robustness of the 
ease-of-retrieval effect found in this meta-analysis presents a case in which published effects are 
not overly controversial. Many authors who were contacted for data were not only willing to 
respond, but often provided missing data and unpublished studies with non-significant results or 
with offers to contact other colleagues for their file-drawer contents. Thus, this meta-analysis 
underscores the value of sharing data and experimental details. 
 More substantively, we report that a commonly-employed manipulation leads to an ease-
of-retrieval effect of moderate size. This result is important due to the strong connection of this 
effect to other phenomena in psychology such as the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) and various fluency effects (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). This manipulation 
is one cornerstone of a broader set of ideas about the impact of cognitive feelings as information 
in judgment and decision-making (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
 This meta-analysis also extends the boundaries of other meta-analytic endeavors by 
examining the proposed mediator of an effect in addition to the effect itself.  This approach 
allows the total effect to be decomposed into an indirect effect and a direct effect. Thus, the 
adequacy of the proposed mediator can be tested, in addition to its existence. Moreover, 
moderators can be related to the direct and indirect effects, shedding light on the mechanisms of 
moderation.  Finally, when substantial direct effects are revealed by the meta-analysis (as was 
the case here), this serves to motivate future research to uncover the associated mediators.  
 Finally, we believe this meta-analysis serves as a call for pre-registered, large-scale 
replications of the broad category of effects using highly-powered studies. Several studies in the 
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database relied on smaller samples compared to what others advocate (e.g., n > 30; Simmons et 
al., 2011). It is prudent to recommend pre-registered, pretested (in terms of number of “few” and 
“many” arguments), high-powered replications to demonstrate ease-of-retrieval across a variety 
of policy, consumer, health, and other domains. These pre-registered replications ensure that 
there is no cherry-picking of dependent-measures.  
Potential Limitations 
 Data availability due to the passage of time was a major factor in being able to attain 
missing information, especially from early research. Notably, we had far fewer triplets of 
correlations because less than half of the studies that included a subjective ease question reported 
rMY. We thus faced two layers of publication bias: those studies that were not published due to 
failing to find significant results, and those studies with significant results but incomplete 
reporting (especially, no correlation between ease and the dependent measure). When reaching 
out to authors we encountered multiple instances of inability to recover these missing 
correlations because the raw data were no longer available. 
Another source of missing data arises when the goal of using the few-versus-many 
manipulation is simply to provide an alternative procedure for manipulating another construct 
(e.g., connectedness with a future self; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011). Thus, there may be other 
filedrawers filled with ease-of-retrieval studies in which the investigation was not interested in 
ease-of-retrieval per se (i.e., distal studies). 
 Further, we recognize that some studies that rely on the ease-of-retrieval effect do not use 
the few-versus-many manipulation (e.g., Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007; Raghubir & Menon, 
2001). In this meta-analysis, we chose to concentrate solely on the few-versus-many 
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manipulation to ensure that we had comparable effect sizes (when accounting for proximal and 
distal).  
Future Directions 
Our meta-analysis revealed that subjective ease is, at most, a partial mediator of the ease-
of-retrieval effect. Thus, one important future direction is to explore alternative explanations, 
such as unrequested cognitions (Tormala et al., 2007; but see Wänke et al., 1996). The addition 
of questions to measure these and other explanations is straightforward. 
 Second, future research should examine the ecological validity of subjective ease, as 
generated by the few-versus-many manipulation (see Hertwig et al., 2013). While work in the 
field has established how naïve beliefs about ease may factor into everyday judgments (Schwarz, 
2004), researchers have only occasionally asked whether the attributions drawn by individuals 
are beneficial or detrimental (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). That is, feelings may be “non-
normative” as decision inputs, but they may not be “sub-optimal” from a broader perspective. 
For example, Pham et al. (2012) demonstrate that peoples’ predictions may be improved through 
relying on their feelings based on the few-versus-manipulation. Future research should examine 
how and when relying on feelings of ease may be adaptive or maladaptive.  
Conclusions 
 How people rely on their feelings has been a strong area of research for several decades 
(Greifender, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007; Zajonc & Markus, 1982). 
Substantive research topics have spanned both affective (e.g., sadness; Lerner & Tiedens, 2001) 
and cognitive (e.g., ease; Whittlesea, 1993) feelings as they apply to a large variety of outcomes. 
One often-studied cognitive feeling has been the subjective ease of recall for judgment-related 
examples. 
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This meta-analysis addressed the question, "Does ease mediate the ease-of-retrieval 
effect?" Our results suggest the answer is "Yes, but ..." We found that the effect in the standard 
paradigm is robust for proximal effect sizes, although up to one-third of the effect may be due to 
publication bias and the effect can be reduced even more by heterogeneity and correlated error. 
These results also speak to the role of feelings as decision inputs within the feelings-as-
information theoretical framework. As for our focal question, we found that subjective ease is a 
robust mediator, but that an unexplained direct effect is equally robust in both standard and 
moderated paradigms. For moderated paradigms, authors have identified and manipulated 
specific theory-based variables. However, the large residual direct effect for standard paradigms 
serves as a call to action for future research to answer the question, "What else mediates the 
ease-of-retrieval effect?"  
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 Table 1.  
Example cases of proximal and distal effect sizes. 
         
Division and Paper Reason 
  
Proximal 
 
Aarts and Dijksterhuis 1999 
 
People recall instances of biking, then they make judgments about how 
frequently they bike. 
Biswas et al. 2012 
 
Participants come up with reasons why a car may have starting problems; 
participants judge likelihood that a 5-year old used Volkswagen car might fail to 
start anytime within the next 6 months.  
  
Haddock 2002 People recall reasons to like/dislike Tony Blair, then they make judgments about Tony Blair. 
  
Keller and Bless 2009 Participants think of few or many things in their life impacted by having a right leg amputated; perceived negative affect duration was the DV. 
Novemsky et al. 2007 
 
People imagine having to generate reasons for choosing a given product, then they 
make a choice of product. 
Pocheptsova et al. 2010 People think of occasions for going to a restaurant; willingness-to-pay for dinner in that restaurant is the DV.  
Schwarz et al. 1991 People recall assertive/unassertive instances; they make judgments of assertiveness. 
Tsai and Thomas 2011 People imagine reasons to donate or not, then they decide whether/how much to donate. 
  
Distal 
 
Alter and Balcetis 2011 
People consider positive or negative elements of NYC, then they rate the felt 
distance to NYC. The attitude towards NYC is meant to be related to its 
subjective distance. 
Bartels and Urminsky 2011 
People consider how hard it would be to generate reasons their identity would 
remain stable, then their discount factor is assessed. Feelings of connectedness to 
the future identity is argued to be related to discount factor. 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2005 
People come up with exemplars of minorities they like, then they complete 
measures of implicit stereotyping (RT as dependent measure). Accessibility is 
argued to be related to our attitudes.  
Muller et al. 2011 
Participants come up with few or many unfair things about a negotiation game; 
the main DV is cooperation in the negotiation game. There is supposed to be a 
linkage between perceived unfairness and cooperation. 
Pham et al. 2012 
 
People recall times they were correct in trusting their feelings, then make 
predictions about some outcome. Trust in feelings is argued to be related to 
prediction accuracy. 
Schlegel et al. 2011 
 
People come up with descriptors of themselves, then judge meaning in life. 
Knowing oneself is argued to be related to meaning in life. 
Sussman and Alter 2012 
Participants think of items they had bought from a product category; willingness-
to- pay for items from that category (based on subsequent questions) was the DV. 
Perceived category size is related to perceptions of being extraordinary and thus 
willingness-to-pay. 
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Table 2.  
Descriptive Statistics of Ease-of-Retrieval Effect Sizes. 
          
Variable Proximal (N = 454) Distal (N = 128) 
   
Year   
M (SD) 2006 (5.25) 2009 (3.33) 
Median 2007 2010 
Country    
United States (%) 254 (55.9) 97 (75.8)  
Non-US (%) 200 (44.1) 31 (24.2)  
Publication Type    
Journal Article (%) 350 (77.1)  101 (78.9)  
Unpublished (%)  104 (22.9) 27 (21.1)  
Paradigm    
      Standard (%)  298 (65.6) 92 (71.9)  
      Moderated (%)  156 (34.4) 36 (28.1)  
Misattribution    
      Present (%) 22 (4.8) 2 (1.6)  
      Absent (%) 432 (95.2) 126 (98.4)  
Target of Retrieval    
      Self (%) 160 (35.2) 74 (57.8)  
      Not Self(%) 294 (64.8) 54 (42.2)  
Target of Judgment    
      Self (%) 256 (56.4) 103 (80.5)  
      Not Self (%) 198 (43.6) 25 (19.5)  
Polarized Attitude    
      Yes (%) 22 (4.8) 0 (0)  
      No (%) 432 (95.2) 128 (100)  
Arguments    
M, Few (SD) [Median] 2.50 (1.11) [2] 2.44 (0.99) [2]  
M, Many (SD) [Median] 8.60 (2.95) [8] 9.47 (3.08) [10]  
Measure of Subjective Ease    
Before DV (%) 106 (23.3) 32 (25)  
After DV (%) 290 (63.9) 42 (32.8)  
None (%) 58 (12.8)  54 (42.2)  
DV Type    
Attitude (%) 369 (81.3) 70 (54.7)  
Non-Attitude (%)  85 (18.7) 58 (45.3)  
Median, Number of Ease Items 1 1  
Median, Number of Measures 2 2  
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Table 3.  
Overall Effect Sizes [95% CIs] for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect. 
Effect Size               Combined Standard/Moderated 
Standard 
Paradigm 
Moderated 
Paradigm 
 Total Effect of X on Y (c) – Proximal 
c (all data) 
 
.121 [.094, .149] .253 [.224, .281] -.178 [-.215, -.140] 
c (mediation triplets) 
 
.109 [.073, .145] .223 [.184, .262] -.166 [-.230, -.100] 
 Direct (c') and Indirect (a x b) Effects of X on Y - Proximal 
c’ (mediation triplets) 
 
.019 [-.105, .053] .105 [.064, .145] -.205 [-.273, -.137] 
a x b (mediation triplets) 
 
.096 [.060, .132] .114 [.074, .154] .042 [.010, .073] 
Total Effect of X on Y (c) – Distal 
c (all data) 
 
.164 [.128, .201] .264 [.221, .307] -.082 [-.158, -.005] 
c (mediation triplets) 
 
.154 [.085, .221] .308 [.219, .393] -.125 [-.231, -.015] 
 Direct (c') and Indirect (a x b) Effects of X on Y - Distal 
c’ (mediation triplets) 
 
.112 [.034, .191] .208 [.144, .272] -.121 [-.232, -.010] 
a x b (mediation triplets) 
 
.034 [-.020, .087] .046 [-.029, .121] .002 [-.034, .037] 
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Table 4. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for proximal. 
    Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data Standard Paradigm Data Only 
Moderator Level 
Number of 
Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Number of 
Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Salience Moderators 
Range  454 .009 (.013)  .015  298 -.005 (.012)  .012  
Attention Before DV (+1) 106 .114 (.023)  -.002  73 .245 (.019)  -.005  
 After DV (-1) 348 .124 (.015)    225 .255 (.016)    
Polarized Attitude Yes (+1) 22 -.140 (.056) *** -.064 *** --- ---  ---  
 No (-1) 432 .134 (.014)    --- ---    
Inference Moderators 
Processing 
Motivation High (+1) 12 -.184 (.076) *** -.034 ** --- ---  ---  
(depth) No manipulation (0) 417 .128 (.014)    --- ---    
 Low (-1) 25 .150 (.057)    --- ---    
Processing 
Motivation High (+1) 26 .178 (.057) ^ .030 ** --- ---  ---  
(involvement) No manipulation (0) 404 .124 (.015)    --- ---    
 Low (-1) 24 .008 (.061)    --- ---    
Representativeness Self (+1) 160 .108 (.022)  -019  114 .196 (.021) *** -.030 * 
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 294 .130 (.018)    184 .286 (.017)    
Representativeness Present (+1) 22 -.246 (.065)  *** -.092 *** --- ---  ---  
(misattribution) Absent (-1) 432 .136 (.014)    --- ---    
Relevance Self (+1) 256 .123 (.018)  -.001  180 .221 (.018) *** -.028*  
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 198 .121 (.021)    118 .298 (.021)    
Relevance High (+1) 15 .226 (.076) *** .045 *** --- ---  ---  
(disposition) No manipulation (0) 426 .128 (.014)    --- ---    
  Low (-1) 13 -.194 (.083)       --- ---      
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors 
are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the 
maximum condition index was below 30.  
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Table 4 (continued). 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results 
    Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data Standard Paradigm Data Only 
Moderator Level 
Number of 
Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Number of 
Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year  454 -.006 (.013)  -.011  298 -.008 (.010)  -.009  
Country USA (+1) 254 .117 (.018)  .0004  170 .232 (.019) ^ -.007  
 Non-USA (-1) 200 .127 (.021)    128 .280 (.022)    
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 104 .044 (.027) ** -.035 * 65 .137 (.030) *** -.053 *** 
 Published (-1) 350 .137 (.015)    233 .277 (.015)    
Number of measures (M) 454 .011 (.014)  .014  298 .025 (.014) ^ .015  
Number of measures (Y) 454 .0002 (.014)  -.001  298 .016 (.012)  .014  
Type of dependent 
measure Attitude (+1) 369 .112 (.015)  -.019  239 .241 (.017) ^ -.025 ^ 
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-1) 85 .155 (.030)    59 .292 (.030)    
            
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors 
are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the 
maximum condition index was below 30. 
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Table 5. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal. 
    Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data Standard Paradigm Data Only 
Moderator Level 
Number of 
Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Number of 
Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Salience Moderators 
Range  128 -.009 (.019)  -.005  92 -.009 (.019)  -.008  
Attention Before DV (+1) 32 .170 (.043)   .021  22 .320 (.043)  .017  
 After DV (-1) 96 .165 (.022)    70 .242 (.027)    
Inference Moderators 
Processing 
Motivation High (+1) 6 -.036 (.107)  -.018  --- ---  ---  
(depth) No Manip (0) 118 .176 (.021)    --- ---  ---  
 Low (-1) 4 .115 (.097)         
Processing 
Motivation High (+1) 1 .331 (.207)  .026  --- ---  ---  
(involvement) No Manip (0) 126 .167 (.019)    --- ---  ---  
 Low (-1) 1 -.064 (.201)    --- ---  ---  
Representativeness Self (+1) 74 .162 (.023)  -.018  50 .226 (.030) ^ -.023  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 54 .194 (.033)    42 .307 (.033)    
Representativeness Present (+1) 2 -.250 (.227) ^ -.062 * --- ---  ---  
(misattribution) Absent (-1) 126 .170 (.020)    --- ---  ---  
Relevance Self (+1) 103 .159 (.021)  -.028  76 .274 (.025)  .001  
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 25 .197 (.044)    16 .238 (.051)    
Relevance High (+1) 2 -.015 (.188)  -.040 ^ --- ---  ---  
(disposition) No Manip (0) 124 .165 (.019)    --- ---  ---  
 Low (-1) 2 .409 (.208)    --- ---  ---  
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year  128 -.020 (.022)  -.051  92 -.035 (.024)  -.038  
Country USA (+1) 97 .169 (.022)  .025  73 .268 (.026) ^ .026  
 Non-USA (-1) 31 .157 (.040)    19 .254 (.047)    
 90 
Publication Status3 Filedrawer (+1) 27 .096 (.045)^  -.038  17 .212 (.054)  -.049 ^ 
 Published (-1) 101 .176 (.019)    75 .276 (.025)    
Number of 
measures (M) 
 128 .009 (.021)  .002  92 .033 (.020)  .033  
Number of 
measures (Y) 
 128 -.019 (.021)  -.020  92 .021 (.021)  .019  
Type of dependent 
measure Attitude (+1) 70 .179 (.028)  -.004  51 .275 (.029)  0  
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-1) 58 .155 (.027)    41 .250 (.031)    
            
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors 
are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 and the 
maximum condition index was below 30. 
3Model for bivariate analyses in combined dataset was unable to be run for this covariate; we removed the random intercept for this bivariate analysis.  
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Table 6. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect (combined dataset) for 
proximal. 
Moderator Level N Indirect Effect (axb) Direct Effect (c') Total Effect (c)   
      Mean Effect Size (S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Regression 
Coefficient3   
Salience Moderators 
Range  209 .013 (.010)  .024  -.021 (.014)  -.030 ^ .003  
Attention Before DV (+1) 47 .078 (.021)  -.011^  .021 (.026)  .004  -.007  
 After DV (-1) 162 .102 (.018)    .019 (.018)      
Polarized Attitude Yes (+1) 5 -.037 (.057) * -.020 * -.187 (.096) * -.030 * -.042 ** 
 No (-1) 204 .101 (.019)    .025 (.017)      
Inference Moderators 
Processing Motivation High (+1) 6 .043 (.070)  -.003  -.281 (.109) ** -.049 ** -.051 ** 
(depth) No manip. (0) 193 .098 (.018)    .024 (.018)      
 Low (-1) 10 .086 (.058)    .189 (.086)      
Processing Motivation High (+1) 6 .092 (.065)  .003  .118 (.094)  .016  .019  
(involvement) No manip. (0) 195 .098 (.019)    .016 (.017)      
 Low (-1) 8 .063 (.065)    .004 (.094)      
Representativeness Self (+1) 88 .081 (.022)  -.011  .060 (.025) * .039 * .011  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 121 .105 (.019)    -.010 (.022)      
Representativeness Present (+1) 7 .066 (.063)  -.006  -.364 (.110) *** -.080 *** -.093 *** 
(misattribution) Absent (-1) 202 .097 (.018)    .030 (.018)      
Relevance Self (+1) 127 .087 (.020)  .006  .045 (.021) * .004  -.002  
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 82 .109 (024)    -.023 (.027)      
Relevance High (+1) 8 .051 (.082)  .005  .209 (.091) ** .046 ** .055 ** 
(disposition) No manip. (0) 193 .1004 (.019)    .024 (.018)      
 Low (-1) 8 .009 (.082)    -.209 (.090)      
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
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Year  209 .009 (.009)  -.004  -.015 (.014)  .006  -.008  
Country USA (+1) 114 .098 (.023)  -.004  .018 (.023)  -.0001  -.006  
 Non-USA (-1) 95 .095 (.025)    .023 (.026)      
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 65 .072 (.035)  -.005  -.022 (.028)  -.036^  -.041 ^ 
 Published (-1) 144 .102 (.019)    .035 (.019)      
Number of measures (M) 209 .014 (.017)  .015  -.011 (.017)  -.019  -.001  
Number of measures (Y) 209 -.014 (.014)  -.017  .012 (.017)  .024  .007  
Type of dependent 
measure Attitude (+1) 
176 .087 (.019)  -.012  .016 (.019)  -.008  -.026  
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-
1) 
33 .126 (.032)    .033 (.039)      
             
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors 
are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized.  VIFs were all below 10 and the 
maximum condition index was below 30.  
3 The Total Effect from is provided as a benchmark.  
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Table 7. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal. 
Moderator Level N Indirect Effect (axb) Direct Effect (c') Total Effect (c)   
      Mean Effect Size (S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Regression 
Coefficient3   
Salience Moderators 
Range  44 .019 (.016)  .024  -.023 (.035)  -.116  -.032  
Attention Before DV (+1) 23 .060 (.026)  .112  .092 (.055)  .035  .078  
 After DV (-1) 21 .005 (.017)    .131 (.053)      
Inference Moderators 
Processing Motivation High (+1) 1 -.019 (.171)  -.010  -.287 (.234)  -.055 ^ -.067 * 
(depth) No Manip (0) 42 .022 (.016)    .119 (.038)      
 Low (-1) 1 .074 (.171)    .221 (.234)      
Representativeness Self (+1) 14 .016 (.026)  -.119  .136 (.059)  .190 ^ .098  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 30 .033 (.026)    .090 (.053)      
Representativeness Present (+1) 2 .058 (.180)  .005  -.305 (.248) ^ -.152 * -.139 * 
(misattribution) Absent (-1) 42 .022 (.015)    .121 (.038)      
Relevance Self (+1) 41 .022 (.016)  -.072  .117 (.039)  -.036  -.068  
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 3 .036 (.089)    .054 (.138)      
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year  44 -.012 (.026)  -.014  .020 (.046)  -.119  -.163 ^ 
Country USA (+1) 38 .032 (.013)  -.016  .101 (.043)  .070  .069  
 Non-USA (-1) 6 .-.026 (.027)    .149 (.077)      
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 6 .025 (.071)  -.122  .019 (.109)  .013  -.060  
 Published (-1) 38 .023 (.016)    .125 (.039)      
Number of measures (M) 44 .004 (.025)  -.083  -.004 (.04)  -.025  -.043  
Number of measures (Y) 44 -.002 (.023)  -.037  -.011 (.042)  .017  -.057  
Type of dependent 
measure Attitude (+1) 
28 .048 (.024)  .075  .078 (.045)  -.116  -.093  
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(attitude) Non-Attitude (-
1) 
16 .006 (.019)    .167 (.052)      
             
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors 
are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized.  VIFs were all below 10 and the 
maximum condition index was below 30.  
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark
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Table 8. 
Indirect and Direct Mediation Effects for the Standard Paradigm, Adjusted for Measurement Error in M and Correlated Error 
between M and Y (rMM = .8 and e = f = .34; see Appendix D for adjustment method details). 
Adjustment for Potential Bias 
Indirect 
(median) 
Direct 
(median) 
Indirect > Direct 
(percent) 
Indirect > 0 
(percent) 
Direct > 0 
(percent) 
Proximal effect sizes (N=143) 
None .08 .12 47% 80% 71% 
Measurement Error in M .11 .07 61% 80% 64% 
Correlated Error between M and Y .03 .18 32% 67% 78% 
Both .05 .15 37% 67% 73% 
Distal effect sizes (N=31) 
None .03 .25 13% 74% 90% 
Measurement Error in M .04 .29 13% 68% 97% 
Correlated Error between M and Y -.02 .31 7% 42% 97% 
Both -.03 .34 7% 42% 97% 
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Figure 1. Theoretical organization of moderators of ease-of-retrieval effect.  
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Figure 2. The mediation model of the ease-of-retrieval effect. 
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A. Standard Paradigm, Proximal 
 
 
 
B. Moderated Paradigm, Proximal 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of proximal effect sizes in the standard (A) and moderated paradigms (B). 
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A. Standard Paradigm, Distal 
 
 
B. Moderated Paradigm, Distal 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of distal effect sizes in the standard (A) and moderated paradigms (B). 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
%
100 
 
A. Before Trim-and-Fill (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)   
 
B. After Trim-and-Fill (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right) 
    
C. With Contours (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)                
     
 
Figure 5. Funnel plots for the standard (left), moderated (middle), and combined (right) for 
proximal effect sizes (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel depicts the confidence interval for the 
sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the 
confidence interval after applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha 
contours (white indicates nonsignificant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of 
funnel p < .01) assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true. 
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A. Before Trim-and-Fill (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right) 
     
B. After Trim-and-Fill (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right) 
 
C. With Contours (Standard left, Moderated middle, Combined right)          
  
 
Figure 6. Funnel plots for the standard paradigm (left), moderated (middle), and combined 
(right) for distal effect sizes (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel depicts the confidence interval for 
the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the 
confidence interval after applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha 
contours (white indicates nonsignificant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of 
funnel p < .01) assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true. 
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Figure 7. Mediation model that includes measurement error (errM) and correlated error due to an 
unmeasured confounding variable (C). 
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Figure 8. Scatterplots of unadjusted (Panel A) and adjusted (Panel B) indirect and direct effects 
for all standard paradigm observations in the triplets dataset (solid markers for proximal effect 
sizes, gray markers for distal effect sizes). (Note: Four outlier observations are not plotted, 2 
proximal and 2 distal; however, these observations are included in the analyses reported in Table 
8.) 
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Appendix A 
Example e-mail for reaching out to authors 
Dear []: 
 
[Co-author] and I are conducting a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect.  You have been a contributor to this 
literature, so we hope you can help us.  Attached is a spreadsheet with the data we have been able to abstract from 
your publications.   
 
The data we seek are correlations (as reported or computed from other reported measures) between the few-many 
manipulation (X), the manipulation check on subjective difficulty (M), and the dependent measure of interest 
(Y).   For your attached study, this would be []. In addition to examining the basic effect, we are examining the 
mediation of the effect by subjective difficulty, which is why we need three correlations for each observation.   
 
Importantly, we are separating reported results into experimental conditions that the authors present as conceptual 
replications of the original effect reported by Schwarz et al. (1991) -- the standard paradigm -- and conditions in 
which the authors change the standard paradigm in ways that they expect will moderate the effect, causing 
attenuation or reversal.  Thus, we often get two or more observations from a single experiment. 
 
Currently, we have data from 142 articles and dissertations, 258 experiments, and 539 observations.  It is no surprise 
that the basic effect in the standard paradigm conditions is very robust, and this effect is reliably reduced or reversed 
in the non-standard conditions.  However, there is a significant level of heterogeneity in the effect sizes, and we 
hope to identify the factors that do and do not contribute to this variation.  Also, we hope to explore the role of 
subjective difficulty as a mediator of the effect.  Regarding the latter, we have r(XY) for 85% of the observations 
and r(XM) for 94% of the observations, but for r(MY) only 21% of observations. 
 
What do we need from you?  First, please review how we have separated the conditions of your experiments into 
standard and non-standard paradigms and confirm that they are consistent with your interpretation of your 
manipulations.  Second, we need the missing correlations.  We are happy to do whatever we can to make this easier 
for you.  Below are some options. 
 
OPTION 1:  Send us the original data.  We will only use it for the purpose of computing the correlations we need. 
 
OPTION 2:  Hire a student research assistant to do this work under your direction.  We reimburse you for this 
expense (up to some reasonable amount).  Also, we would be happy to work with this student via phone/Skype. 
 
OPTION 3:  Do it yourself.  Just fill in the yellow cells in the attached spreadsheet.  Alternatively, we have designed 
a website that assists in this process.  It is preloaded with the data we already have, and it has effect size 
"calculators" to make the task easier.  Of course, the RA in Option 2 might also want to use the website. 
 
OPTION 4:  Some combination of the above, or some other process that occurs to you. 
 
Of course, if you have unpublished experiments in your "file drawer" (new or old), we would love to have the 
correlations from those experiments. 
 
Please let us know if you can help.  Thanks in advance. 
 
Regards 
[Authors] 
 
Note: While we used the phrase “very robust” to describe the effect when reaching out to authors, we caution 
against using this language as a template for future meta-analyses so as not to bias authors. It is possible that this 
language could encourage more individuals to send data, but it is also possible it may affect whether individuals 
with successful or unsuccessful filedrawer studies are willing to respond.  
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Figure A1. Example sheet sent to authors to request missing data and to verify our interpretation 
of their studies. 
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Appendix B 
Table of Effect Sizes 
 
Table B1. List of proximal studies using a few-versus-many manipulation in the database –proximal effect sizes. 
Paper Exp Source1 Topic Retrieved Difficulty 
Question2 
Few  Many  DV Misattribution3 XY Std XY Mod 
           
Aarts & Dijksterhuis 
(1999) 
1 J Biking instances A 3 8 Frequency of 
usage estimate 
N r = .23, N = 78  
 
- 
Aarts & Dijksterhuis 
(1999) 
2 J Biking instances B 3 8 Frequency of 
usage stimate 
N r = .30, N = 51  
 
r = -.09, N 
= 49  
 
Aladjem (2010) 1 D Reasons to drive a BMW B 1 10 Attitude-
assertion effect 
(enjoyment of 
listing task); 
attitude 
N r = .32, N = 69.5 r = -.30, N 
= 69.5 
Aladjem (2010) 2 D Reasons why Dutch team would win 
Soccer World 
B 1,2 7, 10 Attitude-
assertion effect 
(enjoyment of 
listing task); 
attitude 
N r = .30, N = 77.5 r = -.44, N 
= 77.5 
Aladjem (2010) 3 D Pro/Con reasons in favor of 
presidential ticket 
A 1 10 Attitude-
assertion effect 
(enjoyment of 
listing task); 
attitude 
N r = .32, N = 65 r = -.31, N 
= 74 
Alter & Balcetis 
(2010) 
3 J Reasons NY (C1) vibrant and 
exciting/ (C2) dirty and dangerous 
N 2 10 Attitude towards 
NYC 
N C1: r = .34, N = 
30, C2: r = .25, N 
= 30 
- 
Angle (2012) pilot D Behaviors engaged in that 
demonstrate university spirit 
N 4 12 Choice of 
University-
related lottery 
N r = .29, N = 61 - 
Armitage (2007) 1 J Instances of taking stairs instead of 
elevator 
A 3 8 Frequency 
estimate of 
stairs; attitude 
towards stairs, 
behavioral 
intention 
towards stairs 
N r = .23, N = 83  - 
Armitage (2007) 2 J Instances of volunteering to help 
others 
A 3 8 Frequency 
estimate of 
volunteering; 
N r = .27, N = 77  - 
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attitude, 
behavioral 
intentions, 
behavioral 
control, 
subjective norm 
Ask et al. (2012) 1 J (C1) Truth/ (C2) lie clues B 2 6 Credibility 
judgment 
N C1: r = .33 N = 
42, C2: r = .31 N 
= 42 
- 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
1 J Times correct in trusting feelings A 2 10 # of Feeling 
Related Reasons 
used to justify 
evaluation of 
book; trust in 
feelings 
N r = .26, N = 59  - 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
3 J Times correct in trusting feelings A 2 10 reliance on 
feelings to make 
choice 
N r = .18, N = 97  - 
Bares (2007) 1 D Shy/mean/friendly/nice/books liked A 1, 3 5,8 How much do 
you like being 
friendly 
(shy/friendly); 
How much do 
people like you 
(mean/nice); 
How much do 
you like reading 
(book); 
frequency 
N r = .30, N = 10; r 
= .02, N = 10; r = 
-.11, N = 11; r = 
.62, N = 10; r = 
.05, N = 10; r = -
.25, N = 10 
r = -.15, N 
= 10; r = -
.05, N = 9, 
r = .15, N 
= 11, r = 
0, N = 10; 
r = -.30, N 
= 10; r = 
.06, N = 
10; r = 
.15, N = 
10; r = -
.40, N = 
9; r = .33, 
N = 9; r = 
.09, N = 
10; r = -
.11, N = 
10; r = 
.04, N = 
10; r = 
.14, N = 
10; r = -
.03, N = 
10  
Bares (2007) F D Shy/mean/friendly/nice/books liked A 3 8 How much do 
you like being 
N r = -.05, N = 44; r 
= .10, N = 44; r = 
- 
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friendly 
(shy/friendly); 
How much do 
people like you 
(mean/nice); 
How much do 
you like reading 
(book) 
-.01, N = 39; r = 
.18, N = 39 
Bartels & Urminsky 
(2011) 
3 J Reasons identity would remain 
stable 
B 2 12 Connectedness 
to future self 
N r = .23, N = 97 - 
Belli et al. (1998) 1 J Specific events experienced when 5-
7 and 8-10 years old 
A 4 12 Judgment of 
childhood 
memory 
N r = .18, N = 152  - 
Belli et al. (1998) 2 J Specific events experienced when 5-
7 and 8-10 years old 
N 4 12 Judgment of 
childhood 
memory 
N r = .21, N = 107  - 
Bianchi et al. (2009) 3 J Positive aspects of the group the 
Germans 
N 3 12 Ingroup 
projection 
ratings; social 
projection rating 
N r = .35, N = 66  - 
Biswas, Keller, & 
Burman (2012) 
1 J Reasons car might have starting 
problems 
A 4 12 Probability of 5-
year old used 
Volkswagen 
failing 
N r = .39, N = 41  - 
Biswas, Keller, & 
Burman (2012) 
2 J Reasons car might have starting 
problems (C1) high need for closure, 
(C2) low need for closure 
A 4 12 Probability of 5-
year old used 
Volkswagen 
failing 
N C1: r = .43, N = 
39 
C2: r = 
.08, N = 
39 
Biswas, Keller, & 
Burman (2012) 
3 J Performance-related problems of 
music CD (C1) neutral exp (C2) 
negative exp 
A 4 12 Probability of 
typical music 
CD from same 
company having 
performance-
related problems 
within 6 months 
of purchase  
N C1: r = .32 N = 
45 
C2: r = -
.28 N = 49 
Biswas, Keller, & 
Burman (2012) 
4 J Reasons car might have starting 
problems (C1) cue absent (C2) cue 
present 
N 4 12 Probability of 5-
year old used 
Volkswagen 
failing; number 
of possible 
reasons for a car 
to have starting 
problems 
C2 C1: r = .28 N = 
50 
C2: r = -
.27 N = 50 
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Bohner et al. (2002) 1 J Reasons of personal behaviors that 
would increase/decrease risk of 
rape; (C1) no pres + low RMA 
+decr (C2) time pres + low RMA + 
decr (C3) no pres + low RMA + incr 
(C4) time pres + low RMA + incr 
(C5) time pres + high RMA + incr 
(C6) no pres + high RMA +decr , 
(C7) time pres + high RMA + decr, 
(C8) no pres + high RMA + incr 
B 2 6 Vulnerability to 
sexual assault 
N C1: r = .25 N = 
49, C2: r = .16 N 
= 32, C3: r = .17 
N = 34 C4: r = 
.19 N = 42, C5: r 
= .07 N = 40 
C6: r = -
.10 N = 
37, C7: r 
= .08 N = 
42, C8: r 
= -.30 N = 
37 
Brinol, Petty, & 
Tormala (2006) 
1 J Reasons in favor of comprehensive 
exams; (C1) ease is good, (C2) ease 
is bad 
N 2 10 Attitude 
favorability 
towards senior 
comprehensive 
exams 
N C1: r = .35 N = 
30, C2: r = .38 N 
= 30  
- 
Broemer (2001) 1 J (C1) Desired/ (C2) undesired end 
states in relationship 
B 5 10 Interpersonal 
closeness 
N C1: r = .29 N = 
52, C2: r = .21 N 
= 52 
- 
Bulbul (2007) 4b D Reasons why or why not to purchase A 2 10 Assortment size 
(small or large) 
preference 
N r = .28, N = 42  - 
Carter & Dunning 
(2008) 
1 U (C1, C3, C5) Positive/ (C2, C4) 
negative attributes about (C1, C2, 
C3) George Bush/ (C3, C5) Obama; 
(C1, C2, C5) Democrat or (C3, C4) 
Republican 
A 2 8 Evaluation of 
President; 
judged success 
of presidency 
N C5: r = .03, N = 
42, C4: r = .31 N 
= 7 
C3: r = -
.32 N = 7, 
C2: r = -
.01 N = 
29, C1: r 
= .21 N = 
28 
Carter & Dunning 
(2009) 
2 U Arguments in favor of/against 
constitutional amendment banning 
gay marriage (C1) against + against, 
(C2) against + originally for, (C3) 
for + originally against 
A 2 7 Attitude 
Certainty 
N C1: r = .11 N = 
19 
C2: r - .32 
N = 10, 
C3 = r = -
.06 N = 39 
Carter & Dunning 
(2011) 
3 U Factors that would help Obama in 
2012 for (C1) democrat or (C2) 
republican 
A 2 8 Subjective 
Likelihood; 
percentage of 
popular vote for 
Obama 
N C1: r = .02, N = 
135 
C2: r = -
.12 N = 45 
Carter & Dunning 
(2009) 
4 U (C1) charitable or (C2) Neutral / 
introverted behaviors 
A 2 12 Trait rating, 
relative trait 
rating 
N C1: r = .07 N = 
26 
C2: r = -
.41 N = 23 
Carter & Dunning 
(2009) 
5 U (C1) charitable or (C2) 
Neutral/introverted behaviors 
A 2 10 Self-rated Trait 
rating, relative 
trait rating 
N C1: r = .06 N = 
110 
C2: r = 
.09 N = 
101 
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Carter & Sanna 
(2008) 
2 J (C1) Direct/ (C2) indirect self-
presentation strategies 
B 3 12 Judgment of 
childhood 
memory 
N C1: r = .48 N = 
16, C2: r = .59 N 
= 16 
- 
Caruso (2008) 1a J Assertive A 2 8 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .43, N = 30  r = -.09, N 
= 30  
Caruso (2008) 1b J Assertive A 2 8 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .13, N = 57  r = -.24, N 
= 57  
Caruso (2008) 2 J Creative A 2 6 Self-rated 
Creativity 
N r = .24, N = 48  r = -.13, N 
= 47  
Caruso (2008) 3 J Unsafe feeling A 2 6 Safety N r = .19, N = 38  r = -.39, N 
= 38 
Caruso et al. (2011) 1 U examples in which did not have 
enough money 
B 2 6 Satisfaction 
with personal 
finances 
N r = .05, N = 99  -  
Chang (2010) 1 J Consequences of disease A 2 5 Perceived 
severity 
N r = .28 N = 47 - 
Chang (2010) 2 J Number of ways to prevent 
hemorrhoids 
A 3 7 Perceived 
efficacy 
N r = .21 N = 95 - 
Chang (2010) 3 J Consequences of disease (C1) 
solutions (C2) consequences 
A 2 5 Public Service 
Announcement  
effectiveness 
N C1: r = .32 N = 
48 
C2: r = 
.08 N = 49 
Chang (2010) 4 J Consequences of disease: (C1) tinea 
pedis or (C2) peridontal 
N 2 5 Severity of 
disease 
N - C1: r = 
.09 N = 
99.5, C2: r 
= -.24 N = 
99.5 
Cheng (2005) 3 D Good things about being an Asian 
American 
N 3 12 attitude towards 
being Asian 
American 
N r = -.17, N = 108  - 
Corby & Homa 
(2011)* 
1 J Recent/childhood examples of 
assertive, creative, optimism 
A 6 12 Self-rated traits N - - 
Corby & Homa 
(2011)* 
2 J Assertive, friendly, optimism, 
creative 
A 6 12 Self-rated traits N - - 
Cutright, Bettman, & 
Fitzsimons (2013) 
Pilot J Things in life over which have 
complete control 
N 2 10 Perceptions of 
control 
N r = .37, N = 29.6 - 
Cutright, Bettman, & 
Fitzsimons (2013) 
1 J Things in life over which have 
complete control 
N 2 10 Perceptions of 
control 
N r = .38, N = 59  
Danziger, Moran, & 
Rafaely (2006) 
1 J Reasons in favor of proposal of 
changing number of school years in 
Israel; (C1, C2) high experiential or 
(C3, C4) low experiential 
 (C1, C3) 
B,  (C2, 
C4) A 
2 8 Evaluation of 
proposal to 
change number 
of school years 
in Israel from 12 
to 11 
N C1: r = .16 N = 
66, C2: r = .18 N 
= 79, C3: r = .25 
N = 84 
C4: r = -
.21, N = 
75 
DeMarree et al. 
(2012) 
2 J Times tried very hard to achieve 
something 
A 4 10 Persistence on 
anagrams 
N r = .26, N = 64  - 
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Demotta (2012) 3 D Reasons organization was 
competent 
A 2 8 Competence of 
organization 
N r = .28, N = 128 - 
Deval (2010) 1 D Reasons for choosing vacation 
package: (C1) on-line + high inv 
(C2) memory + low (C3) on-line + 
low (C4) memory + high 
N 2 8 Attitude towards 
vacation 
package; 
confidence (C1, 
C3) 
N C1: r = .34 N = 
44, C2: r = .36 N 
= 41 
C3: r = -
.08 N = 
44, C4: r 
= -.22 N = 
43 
Deval (2010) 2 D Reasons for choosing TV (C1) on-
line + high need for closure (C2) 
memory + low (C3) on-line + low 
(C4) memory + high 
N 1 10 Attitude towards 
3D HDTV; 
confidence (C1, 
C3)  
N C1: r = .35 N = 
46, C2: r = .32 N 
= 44 
C3: r = 
.14 N = 
42, C4: r 
= .05 N = 
43 
Dijksterhuis, Macrae, 
& Haddock (1999) 
1 J Traits on which men and women 
reliably differ; (C1) low, (C2) 
medium, (C3) high 
A 3 8 Judges’ ratings 
of 
Stereotypicality 
in target 
portrayals 
N C1: r = .72, N = 
31 
C2: r = 
.46, N = 
31, C3: r 
= -.50, N 
= 31 
Echterhoff & Hirst 
(2006) 
1 J Memory of experiences on NYE A 4 12 Judged memory 
quality; 
vividness 
N r = .32, N = 93 - 
Echterhoff & Hirst 
(2006) 
2 J (C1) no shock, (C2) attenuated 
shock, (C3) high shock Memories of 
September 11th 
A 4 12 Judged memory 
quality 
N C1: r = .28 N = 
73, C2: r = .41 N 
= 73 
C3: r = -
.07 N = 69 
Eibach, Libby, & 
Gilovich (2003) 
4 J Things about you changed since 
high school 
B 3 12 Judgment of 
self-change 
N r = .33, N = 80  - 
Etcheverry, Le, & 
Hoffman (2013) 
3 J Reasons friend is satisfied B 3 8 Level of 
approval; 
perceived 
relationship 
satisfaction 
N r = .32, N = 44  - 
Florack & Zoabi 
(2003)* 
1 J Reasons for/against investment N 1 3 Willingness to 
invest 
N - - 
Florack & Zoabi 
(2003)* 
2 J Reasons for/against investment A 1 3 Willingness to 
invest 
N - - 
Fox (2006) 1 J Ways in which course could be 
improved 
N 2 10 Course Ratings N r = .28, N = 58  - 
Gawronski, 
Bodenhausen, & 
Banse (2005) 
4 J (C1) Introverted/ (C2) extroverted 
exemplars 
N 3 10 Outgroup 
extroversion 
N C1: r = .50 N = 
16, C2: r = .49 N 
= 16 
- 
Gawronski, 
Bodenhausen, & 
Banse (2005) 
5 J Students high in (C1) introversion/ 
(C2) extroversion 
A 3 10 Ingroup 
Extroversion; 
outgroup 
extraversion 
N C1: r = .21 N = 
35, C2: r = .29 N 
= 35 
- 
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Gomillion (2012) 1 U Ways in which partner facilitates 
academic goals 
A 4 12 Perceived 
partner 
instrumentality; 
academic ability 
test 
N r = -.11 N = 53, r 
= .03 N = 54  
 
- 
Grayson & Schwarz 
(1999) 
1 J Behaviors that could 
increase/decrease risk of assault 
B 4 12 Likelihood of 
being assaulted 
N r = .48 N = 29; r 
= .21 N = 29 
r = -.14 N 
= 30, r = -
.22 N = 25 
Grayson & Schwarz 
(1999) 
2 J Behaviors that could increase risk of 
assault 
B 3 7 Perceived risk  N r = .29 N = 30 r = -.44 N 
= 29 
Greifeneder & Bless 
(2007) 
1 J Reasons in favor of introduction of 
new quarterly surgery fee 
B 2 5 Evaluation of 
surgery fee 
N r = .24 N = 43.5 r = -.19 N 
= 43.5 
Greifeneder & Bless 
(2007) 
2 J Assertiveness B 2 8 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .21 N = 40 r = -.39 N 
= 40 
Greifeneder & Bless 
(2007) 
3 J Reasons in favor of introduction of 
new quarterly surgery fee 
B 2 5 Evaluation of 
surgery fee 
C2 C1: r = .28 N = 
21.5 
C2: r = -
.43 N = 
21.5 
Greifeneder & Bless 
(2008) 
1 J Number of kitchen tools B 4 12 Evaluation of 
kitchen tools 
N r = .27, N = 33  r = -.28, N 
= 33  
Greifeneder & Bless 
(2008) 
2 J Reasons in favor of expansion of 
Mannheim airport 
B 2 6 Attitude towards 
airport 
extension 
N r = .20, N = 44  r = -.11, N 
= 44  
Greifeneder & Keller 
(2012) 
1 J Reasons in favor of airport 
extension: (C1) promotion (C2) 
middle (C3) prevention 
B 2 6 Evaluation of 
airport 
extension 
N C1: r = .24 N = 
39.5, C2: r = .11 
N = 39.5 
C3: r = -
.09 N = 
39.5 
Greifeneder & Keller 
(2012) 
2 J Reasons in favor of airport 
extension (C1) promotion (C2) 
middle (C3) prevention 
B 2 6 Evaluation of 
airport 
extension 
N C1: r = .33 N = 
19.67, C2: r = .18 
N = 19.67 
C3: r = -
.09 N = 
19.67 
Greifeneder et al. 
(2011a) 
1 J Unfair aspects of the university 
admission process 
B 2 4 Procedural 
justice; attitude 
towards the 
ZVS 
N r = .46 N = 23 - 
Greifeneder et al. 
(2011a) 
2 J Unfair aspects about orientation 
exam for (C1) certain or (C2) 
uncertain 
A 2 4 Procedural 
justice; 
organizational 
attractiveness 
N C1: r = .23 N = 
47.5 
C2: r = -
.23 N = 
47.5 
Greifeneder et al. 
(2011a) 
3 J Unfair aspects about orientation 
exam (C1) certainty (C2) control 
(C3) uncertainty 
A 2 4 Procedural 
justice; 
organizational 
attractiveness 
N C1: r = .39 N = 
32.67, C2: r = .16 
N = 32.67 
C3: r = -
.04 N = 
32.67 
Greifeneder et al. 
(2011b) 
1 J Aspects of trust game seeming 
unfair as senders (C1) low 
uncertainty (C2) high uncertainty 
A 2 4 Fairness 
perception  
N C1: r = .34 N = 
30 
C2: r = -
.11 N = 30 
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Greifeneder et al. 
(2011b) 
2 J Aspects of trust game seeming 
unfair as senders (C1) low 
uncertainty (C2) high uncertainty 
A 1 3 Trusting 
behavior 
N C1: r = .34 N = 
27.5 
C2: r = -
.13 N = 
27.5 
Haddock (2002) 1 J Reasons to (C1, C3) like/ (C2, C4) 
dislike Tony Blair with (C1, C2) 
low or (C3, C4) high interest in 
politics 
A 2 5 Evaluation of 
Tony Blair 
N C1: r = .16 N = 
23, C2: r = .38 N 
= 23 
C3: r = -
.11 N = 
27.5, C4: r 
= -.06 N = 
27.5 
Haddock, Rothman, 
& Schwarz (1996) 
1 J Reasons (C1) for or (C2) against 
doctor-assisted suicide 
A 3 7 Attitude 
strength 
N C1: r = .14 N = 
30,  
C2: r = .41, N = 
27 
- 
Haddock et al. (1999) 1 J Reasons (C1, C3) for or (C2, C4) 
against doctor-assisted suicide with 
moderate (C1, C2) or extreme (C3, 
C4) attitude 
A 3 7 Attitude 
certainty 
N C1: r = .36 N = 
20, C2: r = .29 N 
= 20 
C1: r = 
.04 N = 
20, C2: r 
= -.12 N = 
20 
Haddock et al. (1999) 2 J Reasons (C1, C3) for or (C2, C4) 
against doctor-assisted suicide with 
(C1, C2) high diag or (C3, C4) low 
diag 
A 3 7 Attitude 
certainty 
C3/C4 C1: r = .40 N = 
19.5, C2: r = .13 
N = 19.5 
C3: r = -
.35 N = 
19.5, C4: r 
= -.20 N = 
19.5 
Hansen & Wänke 
(2008) 
2 J Arguments against implementation 
of federal DNA databases; (C1) 
discrepant or (C2) congruent 
A 2 6 Attitude towards 
DNA databases 
N C1: r = .34, N = 
31.5 
C2: r = -
.18, N = 
31.5 
Hansen & Wänke 
(2008) 
3 J  (C1, C3) Pro/ (C2, C4) Con for 
voting on Internet 
A 2 8 Attitude towards 
Internet voting 
N C1: r = .32 N = 
37.5, C2: r = .18 
N = 37.5  
C3: r = -
.29 N = 
37.5, C4: r 
= -.07 N = 
37.5 
Hermann, 
Leonardelli, & Arkin 
(2002)* 
1 J Events in your life that led you to 
feel confident about ability to 
perform 
A 2 8 Self-esteem N - - 
Hermann, 
Leonardelli, & Arkin 
(2002)* 
2 J Events in your life that led you to 
feel confident about ability to 
perform 
A 2 12 Self-esteem N - - 
Hermann, 
Leonardelli, & Arkin 
(2002)* 
3 J Events in your life that led you to 
feel confident about ability to 
perform 
A 8 20 Self-esteem N - - 
Hirt, Kardes, & 
Markman (2004)* 
1 J NFC Teams, Sitcomes A 2 8 Winning 
probability 
N - - 
IJzerman & Semin 
(2010) 
2 J Similarities A 3 10 similarities  N - r = -.19, N 
= 84 
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Janssen, Muller, & 
Greifeneder (2011) 
1 J Number of fair aspects of contact 
with company: (C1) experienced + 
certain (C2) inexperienced + 
uncertain (C3) inexperienced + 
certain (C4) experienced + uncertain 
B 1 4 Procedural 
justice 
N C1: r = .15 N = 
130.75 
C2: r = -
.07 N = 
130.75, 
C3: r = -
.08 N = 
130.75, 
C4: r = -
.14 N = 
130.75 
Kadous, Krische, & 
Sedor (2006) 
1 J Reasons for failure A 2 12 Forecasts N r = .20, N = 39 - 
Kadous, Krsiche, & 
Sedor (2006) 
2 J Reasons financial performance 
might not be as positive 
A 2 10 Forecasts N r = 0, N = 42 - 
           
Keller & Bless (2009) 1 J (C1) High faith in intuition, 
unrelated; (C2) high faith in 
intuition, related; (C3) low faith in 
intuition, unrelated; (C4) low faith 
in intuition, related 
B 2, 3 7, 9 Affect duration N C1: r = .32 N = 
20, C2: r = .44 N 
= 26 
C3: r = -
.02 N = 
27, C4: r 
= .05 N = 
24 
Kivetz & Zheng 
(2006)* 
2 J Examples in which yielded to vice 
instead of virtual /overcame a vice 
for a virtue 
N 2 10 Choice of vice 
option over 
virtue option 
N - - 
Kivetz & Zheng 
(2006)* 
pilot J Examples in which yielded to vice 
instead of virtual /overcame a vice 
for a virtue 
A 2 10 Feeling guilty N - - 
Kühnen (2010) 1 J Biking instances; (C1) low accuracy 
+ manip first, (C2) low accuracy + 
manip second, (C3) high accuracy + 
manip first (C4) high accuracy + 
manip second 
B, A 5 15 Frequency of 
biking 
N C1: r = .57, N = 
29 
C2: r = -
.52 N =29, 
C3: r = -
.35, N = 
27, C4: r 
= -.30 N = 
27 
Kühnen (2010) 2 J Assertiveness (C1) B, 
(C2) A 
2 8 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = .18, N = 
37.5 
C2: r = -
.30, N = 
29 
Kühnen (2010) 3 J Arguments in favor of surgery fee; 
(C1, C2) attribution absent, (C3, C4) 
attribution present 
(C1, C3) 
B, (C2, 
C4) A 
2 5 Attitude towards 
surgery fee 
C3/C4 C1: r = .46, N = 
24 
C2: r = -
.32, N = 
24, C3: r 
= -.32 N = 
23, C4: r 
= -.45, N 
= 23 
Kühnen (2010) 4 J Attributes on which men and 
women differ 
(C1) B, 
(C2) A 
2 12 Stereotyping 
(difference in 
percentage of 
N C1: r = .26, N = 
45 
C2: r = -
.30, N = 
46 
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each sex had 
certain 
masculine or 
feminine traits) 
Kunstman et al. 
(2013) 
2 J Felt accepted by outgroup B 2 10 Florida State 
University 
connect score 
N r = .33, N = 35 - 
Kunstman et al. 
(2013) 
3 J Felt accepted by outgroup B 2 10 Internal 
motivation to 
respond without 
prejudice; 
feelings of 
acceptance by 
outgroup 
N r = .22, N = 119 - 
Laham (2013) 1 J Nonhuman animals they feel 
morally obligated to show concern 
for 
A 3 15 Proportion of 
world’s animals 
feel obliged to 
show moral 
concern for 
N r = .38, N = 39  - 
Laham (2013) 2 J Nonhuman animals they feel 
morally obligated to show concern 
for 
A 3 15 Proportion of 
world’s animals 
feel obliged to 
show moral 
concern for 
N r = .31, N = 37  - 
Lai & Kuo (2007) 1 J Piracy-related behaviors B 1 5 Self-positivity 
bias Reduction 
N C1: r = .52 N 
=30, C2: r = .17 
N = 30 
- 
Lee (2005) 2 J Benefits or difficulties of work B 3 8 Work-life 
conflict 
N r = .28 N = 68 - 
Lemay, Clark, & 
Feeney (2007) 
3 J Things done to help relationship 
partner in past 7 days 
A 2 8 Partner 
responsiveness 
N r = .17, N = 151  - 
Menon & Raghubir 
(2003) 
1 J Aspects to recall from Micron ad A 2 8 Recommendatio
n likelihood for 
personal 
computer brand 
N r = .34, N = 133 - 
Menon & Raghubir 
(2003) 
2 J Aspects to recall from Micron ad A 2 8 Purchase and 
recommendatio
n intention 
C2 C1: r = .13, N = 
46 
C2: r = -
.38, N = 
46 
Menon & Raghubir 
(2003) 
3 J Aspects to recall from Micron ad; 
(C1) task difficult, feedback after; 
(C2) task easy, feedback after, (C3) 
task easy, feedback before (C4) task 
difficult, feedback before 
A 2 8 Purchase and 
recommendatio
n intention 
C1/C4 C1: r = .35 N = 
26, C2: r = .45 N 
= 26, C3: r = .41 
N = 26 
C4: r = -
.59, N = 
26 
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Menon & Raghubir 
(2003) 
4 J Aspects to recall from Micron ad; 
(C1) load-difficult, (C2) load-no 
info, (C3) no load-difficult 
A 4 12 Purchase and 
recommendatio
n intention 
C1/C3 C1: r = .35 N = 
36, C2: r = .22, N 
= 36 
C3: r = -
.45, N = 
16 
Merckelbach et al. 
(2001) 
1 J Negative autobiographical events 
before age 10 
N 3 9 Agreement that 
have repressed 
many of their 
childhood 
memories 
N r = -.30, N = 52 - 
Nestler (2010) 1 J Counterfactual thoughts A 2 10 Belief 
perseverance 
N r = .34, N = 40  - 
Nestler (2010) 2 J Counterfactual thoughts A 2 10 Belief 
perseverance 
N r = .50, N = 47  - 
Novemsky et al. 
(2007) 
2 J Reasons for picking a Microwave 
oven or digital camera 
B 2 10 Choice deferral N r = .14, N = 289  - 
Novemsky et al. 
(2007) 
3 J Reasons for picking a camera B 2 10 Compromise 
Effect incidence 
N r = .27, N = 180 - 
Novemsky et al. 
(2007) 
4 J Reasons for picking a Microwave 
oven 
B 2 10 Compromise 
Effect incidence 
C2 C1: r = .25, N = 
111 
C2: r = -
.20, N = 
111 
O’Brien (2013) 2 J (C1) Happy/ (C2) Unhappy 
Experiences in Past, (C3) Happy/ 
(C4) Unhappy Experiences in Future 
B 3 12 Future 
happiness 
N C1: r = .37, N = 
45, C2: r = .40 N 
= 45, C3: r = .37 
N = 45 
C4: r = 
.01, N = 
45 
O’Brien (2012) 1 U Good aspects of (C1) material/ (C2) 
experiential good purchase 
A 2 10 Purchase 
satisfaction 
N C1: r = -.03 N = 
69, C2: r = -.003 
N = 59 
- 
Ofir (2000) 2 J Number of fault reasons; (C1) tree 
1, (C2) tree 2, (C3) tree 3 
A 2 5, 6 Proportion of all 
other problems 
N - - 
Ofir (2000) 3 J Number of specific failure reasons; 
(C1) tree 1, drivers; (C2) tree 2, 
drivers; (C3) tree 1, mechanics, (C4) 
tree 2, mechanics 
A 2 5 Proportion of all 
other problems 
N - - 
Ofir (2000) 4 J Number of specific causal reasons A 1 6 Proportion of all 
other problems 
N - - 
Ofir et al. (2008) 1a J Number of low-priced products sold 
at store 
A 2 5 Store 
expensiveness 
N r = .54, N = 99  - 
Ofir et al. (2008) pilot J Number of low-priced products sold 
at store 
A 2 9 Store 
expensiveness 
N r = .39, N = 134 - 
Ofir et al. (2008) 2 J Number of (C1) low-priced/ (C2) 
high-priced products sold at store 
A 2 5 Price perception N C1: r = .39 N = 
76, C2: r = .27, N 
= 76 
- 
Ofir et al. (2008) 3 J Number of low-priced products sold 
at store  
A 2 5 Store-price 
judgment 
N r = .43, N = 51  
 
r = -.41, N 
= 49  
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Oyserman, Fryberg, 
& Yoder (2007) 
5 J Ways group and Whites are similar N 3 8 Self-rated 
Similarity to 
Whites 
N r = .32, N = 38.67 - 
Oyserman, Fryberg, 
& Yoder (2007) 
6 J Ways group and Whites are similar N 3 8 Similarity to 
Whites 
N r = .29, N = 40  - 
Oyserman, Fryberg, 
& Yoder (2007) 
7 J Ways group and Whites are similar N 3 8 Similarity to 
Whites 
N r = .29, N = 68  - 
Pahl & Eiser (2007) 1 J Behaviors (C1) you / (C2) a typical 
student does in a typical week that 
may be harmful to environment 
A 2 8 Comparative 
self-positivity 
N C1: r = .06 N = 
49.5, C2: r = .23 
N = 49.5 
 
- 
Park (2004) 1 D Reason for purchase (C1) 
compatible prevention (C2) 
compatible promotion (C3) 
incompatible prevention (C4) 
incompatible promotion 
A 1 10 Product 
Evaluation 
N C1: r = .40 N = 
26.25, C2: r = .39 
N = 26.25 
C3: r = -
.35 N = 
26.25, C4: 
r = -.30 N 
= 26.25 
Park (2004) 2 D Reason for purchase (C1) 
compatible interdependent (C2) 
compatible  independent (C3) 
incompatible interdependent (C4) 
incompatible independent 
A 1 10 Product 
Evaluation 
N C1: r = .18 N = 
34.25, C2: r = .57 
N = 34.25 
C3: r = -
.48 N = 
34.25, C4: 
r = -.42 N 
= 34.25 
Petrocelli & Dowd 
(2009) 
3 J If-only statements A 4 10 Severity of 
punishment; 
deservingness of 
punishment; 
causality 
N r = .27, N = 49 r = -.20, N 
= 49 
Pocheptsova, Labroo, 
& Dhar (2010) 
2 J Reasons to go to a (C1) causal or 
(C2) fancy restaurant 
A 1 5 Willingness-to-
pay 
N C1: r = .10 N = 
102.5, C2: r = .33 
N = 102.5 
- 
Preston & Epley 
(2005) 
3 J Observations that (C1) God can 
explain, (C2) observations that can 
explain God’s behavior 
N 3 10 Perceived value 
of Belief in God 
N - C1: r = -
.20 N = 
28.5, C2: r 
= -.04 N = 
28.5 
Raghubir & Menon 
(1998) 
2 J AIDS-related behaviors (Self) A 3 5 Risk of AIDS N r = .27, N = 50  
 
- 
Raghubir & Menon 
(1998) 
3 J Ways in which HIV is transmitted A 1 3 Risk of AIDS N r = .30, N = 61  
 
- 
Raghubir & Menon 
(2005) 
1 J (C1) Positive/ (C2) Negative 
experiences eating out 
A 2 8 Satisfaction 
with eating-out 
experiences; 
open-ended 
frequency, 
close-ended 
frequency, 
N C1: r = .23 N = 
47, C2: r = .31 N 
= 47 
- 
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dollars spent 
eating out, 
attitude towards 
eating out, 
likelihood of 
initiating next 
eating out, 
likelihood of 
positive 
experience, 
likelihood of 
negative 
experience 
Raghubir & Menon 
(2005) 
2 J (C1, C3) Positive/ (C2, C4) 
Negative experiences eating out (C1, 
C2) recently or (C3, C4) distant 
A 2 10 Satisfaction 
with eating-out 
experiences; 
open-ended 
frequency, 
close-ended 
frequency, 
dollars spent 
eating out – sit-
down, dollars 
spent eating out 
fast-food, 
attitude towards 
eating out, 
likelihood of 
initiating next 
eating out, 
likelihood of sit-
down, 
likelihood of 
fast-food 
N C1: r = .39 N = 
41.75, C2: r = .31 
N = 41.75 
C3: r = -
.002 N = 
41.75, C4: 
r = -.05 N 
= 41.75 
Rai & Holyoak 
(2010) 
1 J Reasons for employee to take 
proposed Trolley action 
N 2 7 Agreement with 
taking proposed 
action 
N r = .19, N = 124  
 
- 
Roese & Summerville 
(2005) 
3c J Examples of opportunities in (C1) 
Kindness and respect in friendships, 
(C2) meeting new friends, (C3) time 
spent with romantic partner, (C4) 
trust in romantic relationships 
A 2 8 Self-rated 
Regret 
N C1: r = .01 N = 
60, C2: r = .21 N 
= 42, C3: r = -.22 
N = 50, C4: r = 
.01 N = 46 
- 
Rothman & Hardin 
(1997) 
1 J Polite/impolite behaviors A 3 6 Self-rated 
Impolite ratings 
N r = .25, N = 54  r = -.24, N 
= 42 
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Rothman & Hardin 
(1997) 
2 J Assertive/Unassertive A 3 6 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
C3/C4 C1: r = .11, N = 
20.75; C2: r = 
.21, N = 20.75 
C3: r = -
.28, N = 
42.50; C4: 
r = -.17, N 
= 42.50; 
C5: r = -
.14, N = 
20.75; C6: 
r = -.23, N 
= 20.75 
Rothman & Hardin 
(1997) 
3 J Assertive/Unassertive A 3 6 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .12, N = 58; r 
= .13, N = 63 
r = -.17, N 
= 58; r = -
.23, N = 
63 
Rothman & Schwarz 
(1998) 
1 J Risk-increasing/decreasing factors 
for self/avg. man (C1) family history 
+ avg man + decr (C2) family 
history + avg man + incr (C3) no 
family + self + decr (C4) no family 
+ self + incr (C5) no family + avg + 
decr (C6) no family + avg + incr 
(C7) family + self + decr (C8) 
family +self + incr 
A 3 8 Risk Perception N C1: r = .38 N = 
18, C2: r = .59 N 
= 20, C3: r = .42 
N = 19, C4: r = 
.28 N = 17 
C5: r = 
.10 N = 
21, C6: r 
= -.28 N = 
18, C7: r 
= -.55 N = 
20, C8: r 
= -.22 N = 
23 
Ruder & Bless (2003) 1 J Arguments in favor of reduction in 
number of years of education 
B 2 6 Agreement with 
policy for 
change in 
education 
system 
N r = .61 N = 24 r = -.33 N 
= 26 
Ruder & Bless (2003) 3 J Reasons against highway toll; (C1) 
happy + diagnostic (C2) sad + 
nondiagnostic (C3) sad + diagnostic 
(C4) happy + nondiagnostic 
B 2 5 Agreement with 
policy for 
highway toll 
C2/C4 C1: r = .37 N = 
27.5 
C2: r = -
.49 N = 
27.5, C3: r 
= -.51 N = 
27.5, C4: r 
= -.46 N = 
27.5 
Ruder & Bless (2003) 4 J Arguments in favor of reduction in 
number of years of education 
B 2 5 Agreement with 
policy for 
highway toll 
N r = .41 N = 31.5 r = -.29 N 
= 31.5 
Ruder & Bless (2003) F J Arguments in favor of reduction in 
number of years of education 
B 2 6 Agreement with 
policy for 
change in 
education 
system 
N r = .43, N = 24 - 
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Sackett (2006)* 6 D Advantages/disadvantages of 
optimistic or pessimistic prediction 
errors 
N 2 8 Preferences for 
predictions 
N - - 
Sanna, Chang, & 
Carter (2004) 
3 J Thoughts about (C1) outcome/ (C2) 
alternative 
B 2 10 outcome 
inevitability 
N C1: r = .48 N = 
20, C2: r = .58 N 
= 20 
- 
Sanna, Parks, Chang, 
& Carter (2005) 
3 J Reasons for (C1) successful/ (C2) 
unsuccessful task completion 
B 5 15 difference in 
completion time 
N C1: r = .50 N = 
20, C2: r = .55 N 
= 20 
- 
Sanna, Schwarz, & 
Small (2002) 
1 J Thoughts that would have helped 
side win; (C1) G win, (C2) British 
win 
A 2 10 Probability 
judgment 
N C1: r = .45 N = 
28, C2: r = .57 N 
= 29 
- 
Sanna, Schwarz, & 
Stocker (2002) 
1 J Thoughts of other outcomes N 2 10 Probability of 
other outcome 
N r = .51, N = 34  
 
- 
Sanna, Schwarz, & 
Stocker (2002) 
2 J Thoughts of other outcomes A 2 10 Probability of 
other outcome 
N r = .49, N = 40  
 
- 
Sanna & Schwarz 
(2003) 
1 J Thoughts about how homecoming 
game might have turned out 
differently 
B 4 12 Difference 
between actual 
and predicted 
C2 C1: r = .57, N = 
25  
 
C2: r = -
.21, N = 
28 
 
Sanna & Schwarz 
(2004) 
1 J Things that might lead you to do 
well on exam 
B 3 12 Study 
Completion, 
Success 
Likelihood 
N -  - 
Scarnier (2007) 2 D Times controlled child’s behavior A 2 8 Control (over 
ability to 
influence child’s 
behavior, other 
individuals can 
control their 
children better) 
N r = .01, N = 124 - 
Shockley (2013) 7 D Times things went well when stuck 
with tradition or routine 
N 2 6 Resistance to 
Change Scale; 
feelings of 
sticking with 
tradition 
N r = .05, N = 47 - 
Schwarz et al. (1991) 1 J (C1) Assertive 
(C2) Unassertive 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = .35 N = 
20,  
C2: r = .66, N = 
20 
- 
Schwarz et al. (1991) 2 J (C1) Assertive 
(C2) Unassertive 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = .17 N = 
79,  
C2: r = .21, N = 
79 
- 
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Schwarz et al. (1991) 3 J (C1, C3) Assertive 
(C2, C4) Unassertive 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
C3/C4 C1: r = .33 N = 
19.5,  
C2: r = .39, N = 
19.5 
C3: r = -
.28 N = 
19.5,  
C4: r = -
.33, N = 
19.5 
Silvera et al. (2005) 2 J Categories of potential causes of 
failure 
N 2 8 Likelihood of 
all other 
problems 
N r = .28, N = 76  
 
r = -.19, N 
= 86  
 
Simonsohn, 
Simmons, & Nelson 
(2011) 
1 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive N 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = -.13 N = 
24, C2: r = -.20 N 
= 22 
- 
Sinclair & Carlsson 
(2013) 
1 J Typical things done for boys/girls, 
things done where felt capable 
A 2 10 Occupational 
preference 
N r = .13, N = 85; r 
= -.28, N = 73; r 
= .06, N = 59; r = 
.004, N = 54 
- 
Sinha & 
Naykankuppam 
(2013) 
1 J Tourist spots in England A 1 7 Willingness-to-
pay for trip 
N r = .44, N = 47.33 r = -.32, N 
= 47.33 
Sinha & 
Naykankuppam 
(2013) 
2 J Company that makes digital cameras A 1 7 Purchase 
likelihood 
N r = .46, N = 36; r 
= .50, N = 36 
r = -.11, N 
= 36; r = -
.58, N = 
36 
Sinha & 
Naykankuppam 
(2013) 
3 J Painters A 1 4 Willingness-to-
pay 
N r = .50, N = 
44.50; r = .50, N 
= 44.50 
r = -.55, N 
= 44.50; r 
= -.05, N 
= 44.50 
Spielmann, 
MacDonald, & 
Wilson (2009) 
3 J People within their social networks 
with whom they could imagine 
developing a relationship 
B 2 10 Emotional 
attachment to 
ex-partner 
N r = .28 N = 40.5 r = -.21 N 
= 40.5 
Stephens (2007) 1 D Behaviors associated with  (C1) AD 
(C2) HR 
N 3 12 Likelihood 
difference score 
N C1: r = .14 N = 
59, C2: r = .02 N 
= 60 
- 
Stocker (2006) 3 D Positive (C1, C3) or Negative (C2, 
C4) Thoughts about my (C1, C2) or 
others’ (C3, C4) relationships 
B 5 25 Modified 
Investment 
Model Scale 
(IMS) 
N C1: r = -.02, N = 
48.5; C2: r = .27, 
N = 48.5; C3: r = 
.11, N = 48.5; C4: 
r = .08, N = 48.50 
- 
Stone & Fernandez 
(2011) 
1 J Distinct times in last year when 
spent time in sun but did not wear 
sunscreen 
A 2 8 Sunscreen 
acquisition 
N r = .37 N = 45 r = -.31 N 
= 45 
Thorisdottir & Jost 1a J Instances in which they felt 
threatened 
N 3 12 Threatened 
feeling 
N - 
 
r = -.22, N 
= 48 
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Thorisdottir & Jost 1b J Instances in which they felt 
threatened 
N 3 12 perceived threat N -  
 
r = -.26, N 
= 50 
Tormala, Petty, & 
Brinol (2002) 
1 J Reasons against comprehensive 
exams 
N 2 8 Attitude towards 
senior 
comprehensive 
exams 
N r = .25, N = 57 r = -.26, N 
= 57 
Tormala, Petty, & 
Brinol (2002) 
2 J Positive thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 8 Attitude towards 
senior 
comprehensive 
exams 
N r = .25, N = 60.5 r = -.20, N 
= 60.5 
Tormala, Petty, & 
Brinol (2002)* 
3 J Positive thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
A 2 10 Attitude towards 
senior 
comprehensive 
exams 
N - - 
Tormala, Falces, 
Brinol, & Petty 
1 J Positive thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 10 Attitude towards 
comprehensive 
exams 
N r = .44, N = 28  - 
Tormala, Falces, 
Brinol, & Petty 
2 J Negative thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 10 Attitude towards 
comprehensive 
exams 
N r = .34, N = 38  - 
Tormala, Falces, 
Brinol, & Petty 
3 J Assertiveness A 2 10 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .23, N = 74  - 
Tormala, Falces, 
Brinol, & Petty 
4 J Positive thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 10 Attitude towards 
comprehensive 
exams; 
confidence 
N r = .34, N = 43  - 
Tsai & McGill (2011) 1 J Reasons for preferring one camera 
over another for (C1) low or (C2) 
high construal 
A 2 10 Choice 
confidence 
N C1: r = .42 N = 
44.5, C2: r = .25 
N = 44.5 
- 
Tsai & McGill (2011) 3 J Reasons for preferring one movie 
over another; (C1, C3) low or (C2, 
C4) high construal with (C1, C2) no 
attribution or (C3, C4) attribution 
A 2 8 Choice 
confidence 
C3/C4 C1: r = .34 N = 
29.5, C2: r = .37 
N = 29.5 
C3: r = -
.09 N = 
32.5, C4: r 
= 0 N = 
32.5 
Tsai & Thomas 
(2011) 
2 J Reasons for donating in support of 
polar bears; (C1) abstract or (C2) 
concrete 
A 2 8 Donation 
amount 
N   
Tybout et al. (2005) 1 J Reasons to drive a Hyundai/BMW A 1 10 Product 
evaluation 
N r = .32, N = 49.5  
 
r = -.29, N 
= 49.5  
 
Tybout et al. (2005) 2 J Reasons to drive a (C3) Saab/(C1) 
Hyundai/ (C2) BMW 
A 1 10 Product 
evaluation 
N C1: r = .30, N = 
34.3  
C2: r = .40, N = 
34.3  
 
C3: r = -
.46, N = 
34.3  
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Tybout et al. (2005) 4 J Reasons to drive a BMW N 1 10 Product 
evaluation 
N r = .15, N = 20.5  
 
r = -.05, N 
= 20.5 
 
Unkelbach & 
Plessner (2007) 
2 J Reasons (C1) for/ (C2) against 
sports-stadium 
A 2 6 Preference N C1: r = .19 N = 
30, C2: r = .38 N 
= 27  
- 
Vastfjall, Peters, & 
Slovic (2008) 
2 J Major natural disasters that occurred 
in world in last 100 years 
N 2 6 Risk perception N r = .45, N = 89  - 
Vaughn (1998) 1 D Assertive/Unassertive A 3 8 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .28, N = 40; r 
= -.20, N = 40 
r = .35, N 
= 40; r = 
0, N = 40 
Vaughn (1998) 2 D Positive things seen in Detroit A 3 7 Desire to live in 
Detroit 
N r = .06, N = 55 r = -.49, N 
= 50 
Vaughn (1998) 3 D Positive things seen in Detroit A 3 9 Evaluation of 
Detroit 
N r = -.36, N = 29 R = .24, N 
= 30 
Vaughn (1999) 1 J Things that you doing to improve 
chances of getting good grades on 
finals: (C1) hard + start, (C2) hard + 
end, (C3) easy + end, (C4) easy + 
start 
A 3 8 Self-efficacy N C1: r = .25, N = 
43.75 
C2: r = -
.01, N = 
43.75, C3: 
r = .08, N 
= 43.75, 
C4: r = -
.07, 43.75 
Vaughn & Weary 
(2002) 
1 J Reasons event would happen to 
them, personally; (C1) no dysphoria 
or (C2) dysphoria 
A 2 5 Likelihood 
judgment 
N C1: r = .11 N = 
45, C2: r = -.04 N 
= 50 
- 
Von Helversen et al. 
(2008) 
1 J Arguments in favor of public transit A 4 12 Attitude about 
public transport 
N r = .46, N = 20  - 
Von Helversen et al. 
(2008) 
2 J (C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive A 4 11 Assertiveness N C1: r = .40 N = 
24, C2: r = .28 N 
= 24 
- 
Walton & Cohen 
(2007)* 
1 J Friends who had personal 
characteristics that would make 
them likely to fit in at the school’s 
CS department 
A 2 8 Sense could fit 
in and succeed 
N - - 
Walton & Cohen 
(2007)* 
F J Skills in domain A 2 8 Sense could fit 
in and succeed 
N - - 
Walton & Cohen 
(2007)* 
P J Friends who had personal 
characteristics that would make 
them likely to fit in at the school’s 
CS department 
A 2 8 Sense could fit 
in and succeed 
N - - 
Wänke, Bless, & 
Biller (1996) 
1 J Reasons (C1) for/ (C2) against 
public transit 
A 3 7 Confidence; 
attitude towards 
using public 
transporation 
N C1: r = .35 N = 
35, C2: r = .12 N 
= 32  
- 
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Wänke, Bohner, & 
Jurkowitsch (1997) 
1 J Reasons to (C1, C3) drive/ (C2, C4) 
not to drive BMW with (C1, C2) 
actual or (C3, C4) anticipated 
experience 
A, N 1 10 BMW 
Evaluation; 
Mercedes 
Evaluation; 
Direct 
preference 
N C1: r = .28 N = 
38, C2: r = .47 N 
= 25, C3: r = .45 
N = 42, C4: r = 
.44 N = 55 
- 
Weaver, Vandello, & 
Bosson (2013) 
2 J Specific behaviors meeting cultural 
ideals for real man 
B 2 10 Masculinity; 
private (C1) 
versus public 
(C2) 
N C1: r = .34, N = 
38 C2: r = .13, N 
= 35 
- 
           
Wehr (2010)* 1 J Autobiographical situations which 
were typical problem episodes or 
exceptions 
A 1 5 Social Skill N - - 
Wehr (2010) 2 J Autobiographical situations which 
were typical problem episodes or 
exceptions 
B 1 5 Coping 
confidence, 
serious 
N r = .18 N = 46, r 
= .14 N = 46 
- 
Weick & Guinote 
(2008) 
1a J Arguments in favor of sending 
humans to Mars 
A 2 6 Attitude towards 
sending humans 
to Mars 
N r = .39, N = 68 r = .09, N 
= 68 
Weick & Guinote 
(2008) 
2 J Leisure events A 2 10 Leisure time 
satisfaction 
N r = .30, N = 41.5 r = -.28, N 
= 41.5 
Weick & Guinote 
(2008) 
3 J Attributes on which men and 
women differ 
B 2 12 Stereotypicality; 
percentage 
estimate 
N r = .24, N = 66 r = -.21, N 
= 66 
Weick & Guinote 
(2008) 
4 J Arguments in favor of new 
identification card 
A 3 7 Attitude toward 
new 
identification 
card 
N r = .10, N = 64 r = -.10, N 
= 64 
Winkielman, 
Schwarz, & Belli 
(1998) 
1 J Events experienced when 5-7 or 8-
10 years old 
A 4 12 Judged 
childhood 
memory 
N r = .34, N = 48  - 
Winkielman & 
Schwarz (2001) 
1 J Events experienced when 5-7 or 8-
10 years old; (C1) pleasant 
childhood difficult to remember / 
(C2) unpleasant childhood difficult 
to remember 
N 4 12 Childhood 
pleasantness 
N (C1) r = .19 N = 
179, (C2) r = .03 
N = 179  
 
 
- 
Woltin, Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
1 J Assertive A 4 10 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .32, N = 74 - 
Woltin, Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
2 J Creative A 2 6 Self-rated 
Creativity 
C2 C1: r = .35, N = 
44 
C2: r = -
.19, N = 
41 
Woltin, Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
3 J Creative A 2 6 Self-rated 
Creativity 
N r = .43, N = 48 r = .04, N 
= 47 
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Woltin, Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
4 J Assertive A 2 8 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .17, N = 59 r = -.19, N 
= 62 
Woltin, Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
5 U Extraversion/lack of extraversion A 2 5 Self-rated 
Extroversion 
N r = .38, N = 63 r = -.04, N 
= 63 
Woltin, Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
6 U Creative A 2 6 Self-rated 
Creativity 
N r = -.09, N = 75.5 r = -.10, N 
= 75.5 
Wood (2010) 5 J Big changes going on in life right 
now 
N 2 8 Choice of snack N r = .15, N = 240 
 
- 
Yahalom & Schul 
(2013) 
1 J Assertive N 4 10 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .27, N = 43.3 r = -.29, N 
= 43.3 
Yahalom & Schul 
(2013) 
2 J Assertive A 4 10 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .40, N = 40 r = .02, N 
= 40 
Yahalom & Schul 
(2013) 
3 J Assertive A 4 10 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N r = .36, N = 59 r = -.17, N 
= 59 
Yeager & Krosnick 
(2002) 
1 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive A 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = -.016 N = 
674, C2: r = .07 
N = 623 
- 
Yeager & Krosnick 
(2010) 
2 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive A 3 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = .03 N = 
404, C2: r = .07 
N = 373 
- 
Yeager & Krosnick 
(2012) 
3 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive A 3 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = .04 N = 
1532, C2: r = -.02 
N = 1579 
- 
Yeager & Krosnick 
(2012) 
4 U (C1, C3) Assertive/ (C2, C4) 
Unassertive 
(C1, C2) 
B, (C3, 
C4) A 
3 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = .003 N = 
517, C2: r = -.02 
N = 522, C3: r = 
.04 N = 526, C4: 
r = .04 N = 540 
- 
Yeager & Krosnick 
(2013) 
5 U (C1, C3) Assertive/ (C2, C4) 
Unassertive 
(C1, C2) 
B, (C3, 
C4) A 
3 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = .06 N = 
772, C2: r = -.05 
N = 727, C3: r = 
.10 N = 817, C4: 
r = -.05 N = 776 
- 
Yeager & Krosnick 
(2013) 
6 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) Unassertive A 3 12 Self-rated 
Assertiveness 
N C1: r = -.01 N = 
108, C2: r = -.04 
N = 110 
- 
Yoke (2009) 2 D Well-known successful same-sex 
role models 
A 6 12 Math interest N r = .19, N = 79 - 
Zhao, Hoeffler, & 
Dahl (2012) 
2 J Activities could do with X1-100 A 1 8 Product 
Evaluation 
N r = .32, N = 43 r = -.07, N 
= 41 
Zhao, Hoeffler, & 
Dahl (2012) 
3 J Activities could do with X1-100 A 1 8 Product 
Evaluation 
N r = .28, N = 55 - 
Zhao, Hoeffler, & 
Dahl (2012) 
4 J Activities could do with Z-500 A 1 8 product 
evaluation 
N r = .38, N = 55 r = -.01, N 
= 58 
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Notes: Positive effect sizes reflect results in line with the predictions of the original ease-of-retrieval result; for example, generating more arguments in favor of a position yields 
less support in subsequent dependent measures for that position. Negative effect sizes reflect reversals of those predicted effects. 
* indicates study was not included in the final analysis due to exclusion due to statistical insufficiency. 
1J = Journal, D = Dissertation, U = Unpublished 
2 B=Before, A=After, N=None 
3 N = None 
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Table B2. List of studies using a few-versus-many manipulation in the database – distal effect sizes.  
Paper Exp Source1 Topic Retrieved Difficulty 
Question2 
Few  Many  DV Misattribution3 XY Std XY Mod 
           
Alter & Balcetis 
(2010) 
3 J Reasons NY (C1) vibrant and 
exciting/ (C2) dirty and dangerous 
N 2 10 Subjective 
Distance from 
Princeton to 
New York City 
N C1: r = .32, N = 
30, C2: r = .41, N 
= 30 
- 
Avnet (2005) 2 D Times correct in trusting feelings: 
(C1) pleasant or (C2) unpleasant 
N 2 10 Book Ratings N C1: r = .19 N = 
26.5, C2: r = .56 
N = 26.5 
- 
           
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
2 J Times correct in trusting feelings for 
(C1) pleasant or (C2) unpleasant 
A 2 10 Attitude towards 
reading 
N C1: r = .11 N = 
26, C2: r = .48 N 
= 26 
- 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
3 J Times correct in trusting feelings A 2 10 Ratio Bias N r = ., N = 97  - 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
4 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Acceptance of 
20% share of 
pie in 
Ultimatum 
Game 
N r = .18 N = 37 - 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
5 J Times correct in trusting feelings: 
(C1, C2) low relevant or (C3, C4) 
high relevance for (C1, C3) pleasant 
or (C2, C4) unpleasant 
A 2 10 Recommendatio
n of whether 
friend should 
meet their target 
N C1: r = .31 N = 
26, C2: r = .49 N 
= 31 
C3: r = .10 N = 
34, C4: r = -.12 
N = 35 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
6 J Times correct in trusting feelings: 
(C1, C2) no load or (C3, C4) load 
for (C1, C3) pleasant or (C2, C4) 
unpleasant 
A 2 10 Evaluations of 
nonfiction book 
N C1: r = .36 N = 
42, C2: r = .05 N 
= 49 
C2: r = -.17 N = 
22, C4: r = -.07 
N = 26 
Bartels & Urminsky 
(2011) 
3 J Reasons identity would remain 
stable 
B 2 12 Discount factor N r = .32, N = 97 - 
Bartels & Urminsky 
(2011) 
4 J Reasons identity would remain 
stable 
B 2 12 Discount factor; 
impatience 
N r = .28, N = 71  - 
Beck (2004) 3 D (C1) Successful/ (C2) unsuccessful 
metamemory judgments 
N 3 7 Predicted 
success 
N C1: r = .0 N = 26, 
C2: r = .41 N = 
26 
- 
Beck (2004) 4 D Reasons would or would not be 
successful 
N 2 6 Valence of 
metamemory 
assessments 
N r = .11, N = 51 - 
Carter & Sanna 
(2008) 
2 J (C1) Direct/ (C2) indirect self-
presentation strategies 
B 3 12 Subjective 
Distance 
N C1: r = .48 N = 
16, C2: r = .59 N 
= 16 
- 
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Caruso et al. (2011) 1 U Everyday purchases B 2 6 Satisfaction 
with personal 
finances 
N -  r = .09, N 
= 51  
Cheng (2005) 3 D Good things about being an Asian 
American 
N 3 12 Bicultural 
Identity 
Integration 
Scale-Pilot 
Version; 
Distance Scale; 
Conflict scale 
N r = .07, N = 108  - 
Crescioni (2012) 1 D Stressors B 3 12 Combined 
persistence 
(attempts and 
time spent on 
puzzle) 
N r = .37, N = 38 - 
Cutright, Bettman, & 
Fitzsimons (2013) 
1 J Things in life over which have 
complete control 
N 2 10 Attitude 
favorability 
towards brand 
extension; 
perceived 
control 
N r = .35, N = 59 - 
Cutright, Bettman, & 
Fitzsimons (2013) 
3 J Things in life over which have 
complete control 
N 2 10 Likelihood of 
considering 
extension 
N r = .53, N = 46.5 r = .11, N 
= 46.5 
Ehrlinger (2004) 9 D Reasons might lose money with 
investment 
B 3 12 Overconfidence N r = .33, N = 33  - 
Eibach, Libby, & 
Gilovich (2003) 
4 J Things about you changed since 
high school 
B 3 12 External world 
change 
N r = .25, N = 80  - 
Etkin & Ratner 
(2013) 
4 J (C1, C2) Similarities/ (C3, C4) 
Differences in protein bars for (C1, 
C3) temporally near or (C2, C4) 
temporally far 
N 2 10 Motivation to 
pursue fitness 
goal 
N C1: r = .16 N = 
37.75, C2: r = .17 
N = 37.75, C3: r 
= .28 N = 37.75, 
C4: r = .12 N = 
37.75 
- 
Fuller, McIntyre, & 
Oberleitner (2013) 
1 J Instances of (C1) success/ (C2) 
failure 
A 3 9 Performance on 
trivial pursuit; 
comparative 
ability 
assessment; 
performance 
perception 
N C1: r = .40 N = 
20, C2: r = .33 N 
= 21 
- 
Gawronski (2003) 3 J Counterarguments to (C1, C2) pro/ 
(C3, C4) con for (C1, C3) having 
freedom or (C2, C4) not 
N 2 7 Attitude 
attribution 
N C1: r = .11 N = 
19.75, C2: r = .35 
N = 19.75, r = .35 
- 
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N = 19.75, r = .34 
N = 19.75 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen (2005) 
1 J (C1) Liked/ (C2) Disliked African 
Americans 
A 3 10 Implicit 
prejudice 
N C1: r = .32 N = 
18, C2: r = .59 N 
= 17 
- 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen (2005) 
2 J Disliked African Americans (C1) 
response compatibility (C2) 
stimulus compatibility 
A 3 10 Implicit 
prejudice 
N C1: r = .51 N = 
21 
C2: r = -
.40 N = 22 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen (2005) 
3 J Women considered strong (C1) 
response compatibility (C2) 
stimulus compatibility 
A 3 10 Implicit 
stereotyping 
N C1: r = .34 N = 
31 
C2: r = -
.34 N = 32 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen (wp) 
1 U African American individuals whom 
they particularly disliked 
B 5 12 Implicit 
Prejudice 
C2 C1: r = .39, N = 
24 
C2: r = -
.28, N = 
24 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen (wp) 
2 U Strong women they particularly 
disliked 
B 5 12 Implicit 
Stereotyping 
C2 C1: r = .41, N = 
22 
C2: r = -
.19, N = 
24 
Gershoff, Mukherjee, 
& Mukhopadhyay 
(2008) 
3 J Things liked about movie A 3 8 False Consensus N r = .34, N = 103 - 
Greifeneder et al. 
(2011b) 
1 J Aspects of trust game seeming 
unfair as senders (C1) low 
uncertainty (C2) high uncertainty 
A 2 4 Trusting 
Behavior 
N C1: r = .29 N = 
30 
C2: r = -
.25, N = 
30 
Greifeneder et al. 
(2011b) 
2 J Aspects of trust game seeming 
unfair as senders (C1) low 
uncertainty (C2) high uncertainty 
A 1 3 Trusting 
behavior 
N C1: r = .34 N = 
27.5 
C2: r = -
.13 N = 
27.5 
Haddock (2004) 2 J Reasons how (C2) personally made 
event happen/ (C1)other people and 
external factors made event happen 
A 1 6 Temporal bias N C2: r = .24, N = 
43.5 
C1: r = -
.29, N = 
43.5 
IJzerman & Semin 
(2010) 
2 J Similarities A 3 10 Ambient 
temperature  
N - r = .28, N 
= 50  
IJzerman & Semin 
(2010) 
3 J Similarities N 3 10 Ambient 
temperature 
N - r = .25, N 
= 70  
IJzerman & Semin 
(2010) 
4 J Differences N 3 10 Ambient 
temperature 
N - r = .39, N 
= 36  
Janiszewski, 
Lichtenstein, & 
Belyavsky (2008) 
3 J Bike feature/place to use the bike; 
(C1) intermediate offer, (C2) 
premium offer, or (C3) standard 
offer 
A 1 3 Transaction 
commitment 
N C1: r = .17, N = 
56 
C2: r = -
.24 N = 
63, C3: r 
= .03 N = 
55 
Keller & Bless (2005) 1 J (C1) Stereotypic/(C2) non-
stereotypic personal experiences 
B 2 5, 6 Emotional 
intelligence test 
performance 
N C1: r = .27 N = 
43, C2: r = .18 N 
= 43 
- 
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Kennedy (2008) 1 D Reasons why academic event was 
positive/negative in (C1) first or 
(C2) 3rd person 
B 3 12 Inevitability 
rating 
(Hindsight 
Judgment) 
N C1: r = -.12 N = 
52 
C2: r = -
.22 N = 52 
Kennedy (2008) 2 D Reasons about why performed in 
low percentile (C1) first or (C2) 3rd 
person 
B 3 12 Anticipated, 
Expected 
(Hindsight 
Judgments) 
N C1: r = .06 N = 
26.5 
C2: r = -
.10 N = 
26.5 
Lee (2005) 1 J Benefits or difficulties of work A 2 6 Possible selves N r = .30 N = 79.5 - 
Lee, Amir, & Ariely 
(2009) 
3 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Number of 
transitivity 
violations 
N r = .20, N = 101  r = .03, N 
= 101  
Ling (2009) 3 D Instances of optimistic thinking N 2 8 Purchase 
decision; 
motivation 
N r = .27, N = 76.5 r = -.15, N 
= 76.5 
Ling (2009) 7 D Instances of optimistic thinking N 2 8 Exercise 
intention 
N r = .26, N = 
38.75; r = .43, N 
= 38.75 
r = .18, N 
= 38.75; r 
= -.17, N 
= 38.75 
Ling (2009) 8 D Instances of optimistic thinking N 2 8 Willingness-to-
pay 
N r = .10, N = 
48.50; r = .33, N 
= 48.50 
r = -.29, N 
= 48.50; r 
= .08, N = 
48.50 
Min & Arkes (2012) 1 J Wedding planning steps A 2 5 Optimistic bias 
(predicted 
minus actual 
completion 
times); accuracy 
N r = .19, N = 103 - 
Min & Arkes (2012) 2 J Class assignment planning steps; 
(C1) pessimistic or (C2) optimistic 
A 2 5 Optimistic bias 
(predicted 
minus actual 
completion 
times); accuracy 
N C1: r = .17 N = 
36, C2: r = .39 N 
= 39 
- 
Min & Arkes (2012) 3 J Steps of planning; (C1) ease is bad 
or (C2) ease is good 
A 2 8 Optimistic bias 
(predicted 
minus actual 
completion 
times); accuracy 
N C1: r = .26 N = 
60, C2: r = .16 N 
= 58 
- 
Müller et al. (2010) 1 J Unfair aspects of negotiation 
procedure 
B 2 4 Cooperative 
Behavior 
N r = .29, N = 51 r = -.31, N 
= 51 
Ofir et al. (2008) 1b J Number of low-priced products sold 
at store 
A 2 5 Store 
favorability 
N r = .48, N = 100 - 
Park (2009) 1a D What another person would say 
during conversation 
A 4 15 Overall attitude 
towards group 
N r = -.03, N = 104 - 
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Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
1 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .10, N = 231 - 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
2 J Times correct in trusting feelings, 
Times searching for info on Google 
N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .27, N = 85.5 r = -.03, N 
= 85.5 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
4 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .19, N = 134 - 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
5 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .11, N = 204 - 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
6 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .23, N = 52 - 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
8 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .37, N = 
116.67 
- 
Redden & Galak 
(2012) 
2 J Last times heard favorite song N 2 6 Choice of 
favorite song 
N r = .22, N = 
200.67  
 
- 
Sanna, Chang, & 
Carter (2004) 
3 J Thoughts about (C1) outcome/ (C2) 
alternative 
B 2 10 Subjective 
temporal 
distance 
N C1: r = .66 N = 
20, C2: r = .69 N 
= 20 
- 
Sanna, Parks, Chang, 
& Carter (2005) 
3 J Reasons for (C1) successful/ (C2) 
unsuccessful task completion 
B 5 15 Subjective 
temporal 
distance 
N C1: r = .51 N = 
20, C2: r = .57 N 
= 20 
- 
Sharma et al. (2014) 2 J Times worse off financially N 2 10 Dishonesty rate N r = .28, N = 50  - 
Sharma et al. (2014) 2pilo
t 
J Times worse off financially, 
Assertive 
A 2 10 Self-rated 
Financial well-
being 
N r = .32, N = 88.5  r = .01, N 
= 88.5 
Sharma et al. (2014) 4 J Times worse off financially N 2 10 Mean sentence 
severity 
N r = 0, N = 96  - 
Sharma et al. (2014) 4 f J Times worse off financially N 2 10 Fairness N r = .06, N = 187  - 
Stephen & Pham 
(2008) 
1 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Offers in 
Ultimatum 
Game 
N r = .31, N = 60  - 
Stephen & Pham 
(2008) 
2 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Initial offers in 
counteroffer 
game 
N r = .27, N = 47  
 
- 
Stephen & Pham 
(2008) 
3 J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Offer size in 
Dictator Game 
N r = .36, N = 58  - 
Stephen & Pham 
(2008) 
pilot J Times correct in trusting feelings N 2 10 Self-rated Trust 
in feelings 
N r = .36, N = 36 
 
- 
Sussman & Alter 
(2012) 
4b J Recently purchased items A 3 10 Willingness-to-
pay 
N r = .14, N = 254  - 
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Thorisdottir & Jost 1a J Instances in which they felt 
threatened 
N 3 12 Self-rated 
Closed-
mindedness 
(NFC scale) 
N - 
 
r = -.04, N 
= 48 
Thorisdottir & Jost 1b J Instances in which they felt 
threatened 
N 3 12 Self-rated 
Closed-
mindedness; 
perceived threat 
N -  
 
r = -.33, N 
= 50 
Weaver, Vandello, & 
Bosson (2013) 
2 J Specific behaviors meeting cultural 
ideals for real man 
B 2 10 Imminent 
payoff choice 
N r = .32, N = 35 r = .03, N 
= 38 
Wood (2010) 5 J Big changes going on in life right 
now 
N 2 8 Choice of snack N r = .15, N = 240 
 
- 
Zauberman, Ratner, 
& Kim (2009) 
5 J (C1) Special/ (C2)non-special 
experiences 
N 2 10 Willingness-to-
pay for 
Keychain 
N C1: r = .16 N = 
112, r = .10 N = 
112 
- 
Zhao, Hoeffler, & 
Dahl (2012) 
4 J Activities could do with Z-500 A 1 8 Choice of 
product over 
Amazon gift 
certificate; 
product 
evaluation 
N r = .33, N = 55 r = -.06, N 
= 58 
               
Notes: Positive effect sizes reflect results in line with the predictions of the original ease-of-retrieval result; for example, generating more arguments in favor of a position yields 
less support in subsequent dependent measures for that position. Negative effect sizes reflect reversals of those predicted effects. 
* indicates study was not included in the final analysis due to exclusion due to statistical insufficiency. 
1J = Journal, D = Dissertation, U = Unpublished 
2 B=Before, A=After, N=None 
3 N = None 
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APPENDIX C: STANDARD PARADIGM MEDIATION MODERATOR ANALYSES 
 
Table C.1. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for proximal standard 
paradigm. 
Moderator Level N Indirect Effect (axb) Direct Effect (c') Total Effect (c)   
      Mean Effect Size (S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Regression 
Coefficient3   
Salience Moderators 
Range   .015 (.012)  .032 ^ -.024 (.015)  -.030  .003  
Attention Before DV (+1) 31 .098 (.024)  -.010  .113 (.026)  .006  -.003  
 After DV (-1) 112 .118 (.020)    .102 (.021)      
Inference Moderators 
Representativeness Self (+1) 68 .069 (.024) * -.032 ^ .100 (.029)  .023  -.014  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 75 .144 (.022)    .109 (.026)      
Relevance Self (+1) 95 .095 (.023)  -.010  .087 (.024)  -.036 ^ -.048 * 
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 48 .146 (.029)    .137 (.032)      
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year   .011 (.011)  -.009  -.016 (.013)  .008  -.004  
Country USA (+1) 78 .111 (.026)  -.005  .083 (.026)  -.002  -.006  
 Non-USA (-1) 65 .118 (.029)    .130 (.029)      
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 40 .085 (.042)  -.006  .002 (.039) ** -.061 ** -.070 ** 
 Published (-1) 103 .120 (.022)    .130 (.021)      
Number of measures (M)  .020 (.019)  .017  .015 (.019)  -.019  .0002  
Number of measures (Y)  -.011 (.017)  -.014  .020 (.018)  .025  .012  
Type of dependent 
measure Attitude (+1) 
119 .100 (.022)  -.018  .105 (.023)  -.002  -.021  
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-
1) 
24 .159 (.037)    .104 (.041)      
             
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
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1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors 
are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized.  VIFs were all below 10 and the 
maximum condition index was below 30.  
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark 
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Table C.2. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal standard 
paradigm. 
Moderator Level N Indirect Effect (axb) Direct Effect (c') Total Effect (c)   
      Mean Effect Size (S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1   
Regression 
Coefficient2   
Regression 
Coefficient3   
Salience Moderators 
Range   .019 (.026)  .024  -.027 (.049)  -.017  .045  
Attention Before DV (+1) 15 .075 (.045)  .119  .169 (.096)  -.092  -.005  
 After DV (-1) 16 .006 (.023)    .221 (.106)      
Inference Moderators 
Representativeness Self (+1) 10 -.008 (.029)  -.15  .228 (.114)  .134  -.005  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 21 .028 (.018)    .170 (.091)      
Relevance Self (+1) 28 .018 (.014)  -.041  .221 (.026)  .102  .072  
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 3 .036 (.105)    .042 (.105)      
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year   -.028 (.038)  .038  -.027 (.077)  -.087  -.094  
Country USA (+1) 26 .025 (.010)  -.018  .207 (.074)  .054  .055 ^ 
 Non-USA (-1) 5 -.028 (.030)    .143 (.105)      
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 3 .030 (.107)  -.065  .063 (.108)  .014  -.051  
 Published (-1) 28 .018 (.013)    .219 (.026)      
Number of measures (M)  .014 (.039)  -.053  .035 (.062)  .096  .067  
Number of measures (Y)  -.006 (.031)  -.019  .063 (.059)  .077  .074  
Type of dependent 
measure Attitude (+1) 
19 .068 (.042)  .113  .155 (.089)  -.067  .014  
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-
1) 
12 .006 (.024)    .254 (.114)      
             
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated standard errors 
are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
 
	
137	
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized.  VIFs were all below 10 and the 
maximum condition index was below 30.  
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark 
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Appendix D 
Computational Methods for Testing Robustness with respect to Heterogeneity and 
Potential Bias Due to Measurement Error and Correlated Error 
 
In this Appendix, we describe the computational method used to estimate bias due to 
measurement error and correlated error.   
 Recently, Fritz, Kenny, & MacKinnon (2014, 2016) have detailed the opposing nature of 
biases due to measurement error and those due to correlated error. Figure 7 extends the simple 
mediation model depicted in Figure 2 to depict measurement error and correlated error.  
Measurement error in M creates a negative bias in the OLS estimate of b and a positive bias in c'.  
In contrast, correlated error in M and Y (usually assumed to be due to some unmeasured 
confounding variable) creates a positive bias in the OLS estimate of b and a negative bias in c'.  
Thus, the two biases "cancel" to some degree and the net bias depends on the exact levels of the 
two sources of bias. This fact alone is somewhat reassuring for those who would like to believe 
that the OLS estimates are relatively unbiased and close to the true values.  However, we take a 
more precise and comprehensive approach that adjusts the direct and indirect effects for these 
biases using plausible levels of the two sources of bias for each observation in the triplets dataset 
for the standard paradigm. This approach uses the results and recommendations of Fritz, Kenny, 
and MacKinnon (2014, 2016), MacKinnon and Pirlott (2015), and Pearl (2014).    
Equations 1 - 3 in the text defined the estimates of the traditional OLS mediation model. 
In this appendix, we subscript them with "U" as follows, to indicate that they are unadjusted. 
 aU = rXM (D.1) 
 bU = (rMY – rXY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2) (D.2) 
 c'U = (rXY – rMY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2) (D.3) 
The formulae for estimates that are corrected for measurement error and correlated error 
are as follows. 
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 a = rXMT = rXM (rMM).5, (D.4) 
where rMM is the reliability of M and is determined by the size of d in Figure 7. 
 b = (bU / a) - p , (D.5) 
and  
 c' = c'U - (abU (1 - a) / a) + ap , (D.6) 
where  
 a = (rMM – rXM2) / (1 - rXM2), (D.7) 
 p = ef / [rMM (1 - rXMT
2)], (D.8) 
and the variances of M and C are assumed to be 1.  These formulae and assumptions closely 
follows Fritz at al. (2014; (D.4) is from their equation (4), (D.5) is from (13), (D.6) is from (14), 
(D.7) is from (5) , and (D.8) is from (12) plus (4) and the assumption that SM2 = SC2 = 1). Fritz at 
al. (2016) extended their earlier work by addressing the effects of measurement error in Y (i.e., 
rYY < 1) and by providing explicit formulae for standardized regression coefficients (which we 
necessarily use because our data are limited to the three correlations). The new formula for b is 
equivalent to the one described in the text, given the reasonable assumption that rYY = rMM (which 
is set to .8 in our analyses, see below).  The new formula for c' is equivalent to the one used in 
the text only when rYY = 1 (which is unlikely).  However, for our data, estimates of c' based on 
rYY = 1 and estimates based on rYY = .8 are essentially the same (r = .9987, with means equal to 
.079 and .084, respectively).  We ignore rYY in the text for clarity of exposition, and the fact that 
its effects are relatively small compared to those of measurement error (i.e., rMM < 1) and 
correlated error (i.e., e = f > 0). 
To adjust the OLS estimates of indirect (a x b) and direct (c') effects we chose plausible 
values of error parameters.  In particular, we used rMM = .8 for measurement error because this is 
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the traditional level of minimum reliability used in many research areas. Choosing plausible 
values for e and f was based on the literature on response style (which is the most natural source 
of unmeasured confounding variables for ease-or-retrieval experiments).  in a large scale study 
the effects of response style, Baumgartner & Steenkamp (2001; see also Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
& Podsakoff, 2012) estimate inflation for rMY to be about 58%.  Assuming e = f = .34 yields 
inflation close to this level.  Inflation for rMY was estimated based on Pearl's (2014) formula for 
rMY  = bMY  = d(b + ef + ac'), which yields inflation equal to [(b + ef + ac') / (b + ac')] - 1.  We also 
note that this is close to the moderate level of correlated error used by Fritz et al. in their 
simulations (which were .19, .39, and .59 in the 2014 analyses and .32 in the 2016 analyses).  
This level of correlated error is also consistent with a sensitivity analysis that we conducted for 
the overall average values of rXY, rXM, and rMY in our data, a reasonable range of measurement 
error (i.e., low and high reliability for M, .6 and .8 respectively), and a reasonable estimate of 
correlated error (i.e., e = f = .19, .34, and .39). The results are provided in Table D.1. 
The sensitivity analysis revealed that, for the standard paradigm, the expected bias for 
correlations near the average values for the standard paradigm is such that b and a x b are 
maximally underestimated when reliability and correlated error are low (i.e., rMM = .6 and e = f 
=.19) and maximally overestimated when reliability and correlated error are high (i.e., rMM = .8 
and e = f = .39). For the moderated paradigm, the expected bias for correlations near the average 
values is such that c' (i.e., the presumed causal path when the effect is moderated) is not much 
affected and is always negative, and b and a x b are strongly reduced except when correlated 
error is low (i.e., e = f =.19). 
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Table D.1. 
Sensitivity Analysis for estimated mediation coefficients corrected measurement error and correlated error.  
 Standard Moderated 
Measurement Error (ME) None Low Low Low High High High None Low Low Low High High High 
rMM 1.000 .800 .800 .800 .600 .600 .600 1.000 .800 .800 .800 .600 .600 .600 
               
Correlated Error (CE) None Low Med. High Low Med. High None Low Med. High Low Med. High 
e = f .000 .190 .340 .390 .190 .340 .390 .000 .190 .340 .390 .190 .340 .390 
Raw Correlations and Bias Correction Factors 
1. rXY .248 .248 .248 .248 .248 .248 .248 -.157 -.157 -.157 -.157 -.157 -.157 -.157 
2. rXM .405 .405 .405 .405 .405 .405 .405 .288 .288 .288 .288 .288 .288 .288 
3. rMY .297 .297 .297 .297 .297 .297 .297 .058 .058 .058 .058 .058 .058 .058 
4. rXMT (a) .405 .453 .453 .453 .523 .523 .523 .288 .322 .322 .322 .372 .372 .372 
5. a 1.000 .761 .761 .761 .522 .522 .522 1.000 .782 .782 .782 .564 .564 .564 
6. p (no ME) .000 .043 .138 .182 .043 .138 .182 .000 .039 .126 .166 .039 .126 .166 
7. p (w/ ME) .000 .057 .182 .239 .083 .265 .349 .000 .050 .161 .212 .070 .224 .294 
Estimates of b 
8. b (uncorrected) .235 .235 .235 .235 .235 .235 .235 .113 .113 .113 .113 .113 .113 .113 
9. b (corrected, ME only) .235 .309 .309 .309 .451 .451 .451 .113 .144 .144 .144 .200 .200 .200 
10. b (corrected,  CE only) .235 .192 .097 .053 .192 .097 .053 .113 .073 -.014 -.053 .073 -.014 -.053 
11. b (corrected) .235 .252 .127 .070 .368 .186 .102 .113 .094 -.017 -.068 .130 -.024 -.095 
Estimates of a x b (indirect effect) 
12. a x b (uncorrected) .095 .095 .095 .095 .095 .095 .095 .032 .032 .032 .032 .032 .032 .032 
13. a x b (corrected) .095 .093 .047 .026 .145 .073 .040 .032 .025 -.005 -.018 .037 -.007 -.027 
Estimates of c' (direct effect) 
14. c' (uncorrected) .153 .153 .153 .153 .153 .153 .153 -.189 -.189 -.189 -.189 -.189 -.189 -.189 
15. c' (corrected) .153 .160 .206 .227 .122 .193 .226 -.189 -.180 -.151 -.137 -.188 -.144 -.123 
Estimates of bias 
16. Bias in b .000 -.017 .108 .165 -.133 .049 .133 .000 .019 .130 .181 -.017 .137 .207 
17. Bias in a x b .000 -.019 .038 .064 -.097 -.002 .042 .000 .002 .038 .054 -.016 .041 .068 
18. Bias in c' .000 .008 -.049 -.075 .069 -.026 -.070 .000 -.006 -.042 -.058 .006 -.051 -.077 
               
 
 
 
